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This thesis develops and analyzes the functional architecture for an “autonomous” 
unmanned aerial system performing an Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 
(ISR) mission without a continuous communication link to human operators for trust 
needs. The factors that affect human trust are developed from a literature review covering 
theory and empirical studies that have investigated the importance of human trust in 
human-automation interactions. The identified factors are applied to the functional 
architecture, and the system functions are categorized as Reasoning functions and Non-
reasoning functions. Each functional category is analyzed for trust needs by describing 
how the function’s purpose, process, and performance link to human knowledge, 
perception, and beliefs. From the analysis, automation design requirements that link to 
the identified trust needs are developed. This work highlights the importance of applying 
human factors analyses in the early stages of the Systems Engineering process for 
“autonomous” systems. 
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The driving factor for this research originates from a Defense Science Board 
(DSB) task report from 2012. The task report lists five research topics as recommended 
areas of investigation into the military’s future use of “autonomous” systems. This thesis 
relates to two of the research topics. The first topic is the “methods and metrics for 
confirming that an autonomous system will perform or interact with its human as 
intended and for measuring the user’s trust in the system” (DSB 2012, 12). The second 
topic is the “interfaces that make the basis of autonomous system decisions more 
apparent to its users” (DSB 2012, 12). This thesis concentrates on one DSB identified 
capability gap that is discussed under a category that is relevant to both of the research 
topics. The category is “understandable autonomous behaviors” (DSB 2012, 48), and the 
identified gap from the category is, “models of what operators or decision makers need to 
know about the system or state in order to maintain trust in the predictable outcomes 
from using the system” (DSB 2012, 49). 
This research develops the first iteration of trust-centered design requirements for 
a hypothetical advanced “autonomous” aerial system. The requirements trace to 
identified needs for “understanding autonomous behaviors” (DSB 2012, 48) that can aid 
with calibrating and maintaining trust in the system. This is completed by applying the 
findings from multiple published empirical studies and accepted psychological theory to 
the Functional Analysis stage of the Systems Engineering process. 
The human psychological factors that influence trust are described in the 
following definition which was developed from investigating multiple published research 
papers related trust in automation and the Theory of Reasoned Action: 
Trust is the attitude of a human, developed from beliefs, perceptions and 
knowledge of a system’s functional capabilities, towards the behavior of 
reliance in the system’s actions to achieve the human defined goals in 
situations characterized by uncertainty and vulnerability. (Ajzen 2007) 
From the definition, trust influences behavior; and, human behavior is one of the 
many considerations Human Factors Engineering (HFE) practitioners investigate when 
 xvi
“designing for human use” (Lockett and Powers 2003, 463). Therefore, HFE 
considerations, and thus trust, are important to the system design. Methods for 
performing HFE analysis include task analysis and function allocation (Lockett and 
Powers 2003, 464). Thus, a functional architecture was developed to apply these 
methods. 
The functional architecture developed for the hypothetical advance “autonomous” 
aerial system was based on a capability currently met by a manned aircraft system: 
identifying vessels on the open ocean during an Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance (ISR) mission without communication with another system. Analysis 
performed on the hypothetical system focused on the functions in which the system must 
be given a high degree of autonomy to meet the desired capability. 
The key finding from this research is that an analysis performed on the functional 
architecture of an “autonomous” system linking human psychological factors that 
influence trust to the system’s functional purpose, process, and performance (Lee and See 
2004) can aid in developing system design requirements that directly trace to trust 
calibration and correct reliance in the system. This analysis can, and should be performed 
early in the Systems Engineering Process (Blanchard and Fabrycky 2011, 33) before the 
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This work begins with a short scenario describing an existing military capability 
critical to battlespace awareness. The capability must be retained, but how it is met will 
change if the systems used include an increased number of automated processes than are 
currently in use. 
A. MANNED VS. UNMANNED CAPABILITY GAP 
The crew of an air-capable warship operating independently on the open ocean 
desires to extend awareness of the operational environment beyond its own sensor 
horizon to gain tactical advantage over a potential adversary. Typically, a manned 
helicopter such as the MH-60R is launched to fulfill this capability need. The helicopter’s 
sensors include a multi-mode radar, optical and infrared cameras, passive electronic 
sensors, real-time data link, and a fully trained crew. The helicopter not only extends the 
ship’s sensor horizon via the data link but also brings its own capabilities to the mission 
that extend beyond data link and voice communication ranges with the ship. The 
operating range of the helicopter allows for flying beyond the communication range, and 
the capability of the aircrew team using the helicopter sensor suite allow for collecting 
and interpreting data from the extended operating environment. When the aircrew is able, 
or desires to report findings beyond the communication range, they must either climb to a 
higher altitude or decrease their distance from the ship’s position to regain 
communication. Once communication is reestablished, the collected information is 
transmitted by the aircrew to the ship via data link or voice. The ship can expect the 
aircrew to report information in a known format, and provide all relevant collected data 
points. If uncertainty exists in any of the data, the aircrew can verbalize this in their 
report to the ship. No further interpretation of the transmitted information is necessary by 
the ship’s crew. The employment of the helicopter meets the ship crew needs and the 
sensor horizon is extended. 
Adding unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to the Navy’s inventory of systems has 
allowed the described capability to be augmented. Instead of sending a manned helicopter 
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to extend the ship’s sensor horizon, a UAV can be sent which removes the aircrew from 
any potential threat that may exist in the operational area and from the hazards of 
physically being in the aircraft. The traditional aircrew responsibilities still exist for the 
UAV, but many of functions normally performed in the air are changed. Instead of 
physically controlling the aircraft in flight, the pilot now remotely directs and monitors 
the UAV on a flight path. The sensor operator(s) functions are not any different from 
what they are in the air other than now sensors are tele-operated via a data link. Much 
like in the manned aircraft, the aircrew uses their training combined with the UAV sensor 
suite to interpret the environment they are experiencing through the UAV sensors. The 
most significant difference between using a manned aircraft and using a UAV to fill this 
capability is that a continuous communication link must exist between the aircrew and 
the UAV. While the UAV has removed the aircrew from potential threats in the 
operational area and also from the hazards that flying creates, the UAV, as currently 
used, lacks the same capabilities a manned aircraft has when operating beyond the limits 
of a communication link. This is the existing UAV capability gap. This research will 
investigate the design needs for an aerial system intended to operate without a continuous 
communication link. 
B. OVERVIEW OF AUTOMATION USE 
Automation has been used to supplement, and in some cases completely replace, a 
variety of human work processes. Sophisticated algorithms, speedier processing, and 
miniaturization of components together have allowed engineers to develop systems that 
can, and sometimes do perform processes or actions normally carried out by a human, 
faster and with fewer errors than a human ever could. When automated processes are 
used the human operator is replaced or moved to a different role in the process. The result 
is a system in which the automated machine performs functions traditionally performed 
by a human operator with the human filling the role of teammate, monitor, or supervisor 
rather than operator. Depending on the type of interactions a human has with the 
automated machine the human-machine system can be classified as a human-on-the-loop 
system or a human-in-the-loop system. The human-in-the-loop classification comes from 
descriptions of simulators used for testing and evaluating human-automation systems. 
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Human-in-the-loop simulators require humans to complete certain actions (Sheridan 
2002, 131) before, or in response to automation actions for a functional process to 
continue. The human is therefore in the functional “loop.” From this description, it can be 
reasoned that the human-on-the-loop classification describes a system in which a 
functional process does not require specific human actions to continue. 
The human-in-the-loop and human-on-the-loop classifications are useful for 
describing general human-automation interaction in a system, but as systems become 
more complex, it is better to use these descriptors in terms of system capabilities. When 
the human is primarily acting as a monitor or supervisor, these integrated systems are 
usually described as human-on-the-loop systems. The human monitors the machine’s 
performance and provides instruction when or if needed. When the human is filling the 
roll of teammate, and in some cases supervisor or monitor, the system is described as a 
human-in-the-loop system. In this case the machine depends on human input or approval 
to start, continue, or complete a process. Depending on the process the system is 
executing, the human can be both in-the-loop or on-the-loop for the same system.  
As mentioned in Section A, one clear example of advanced use of automation in 
today’s military is in the use of UAVs. Current UAV processes fit into both the in-the-
loop and on-the-loop classifications. The pilot’s role in the system fits both the monitor’s 
and supervisor’s role by entering flight commands and monitoring system responses. The 
UAV’s onboard flight computer takes the flight commands and manipulates electric, 
hydraulic, mechanical, and power subsystems to alter the aerodynamics and thrust of the 
vehicle to achieved the desired flight plan. The pilot acts on-the-loop in the sense that 
aerodynamic and thrust control of the vehicle is under UAV command. The pilot does not 
control the specific angle of bank for a turn or pitch and power adjustments for climbs 
and descents; they are controlled by an onboard computer system. The pilot acts in-the-
loop in the sense that flight commands need to be entered. The UAV does not determine 
its own flight route. The UAV example illustrates how different system capabilities have 
the human in different roles depending on what actions are performed. In addition to the 
role differences, one can also appreciate how increasing the automation on the UAV 
moves the human further in the direction of an on-the-loop interaction. 
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When a UAV needs to operate beyond or without a continuous communication 
link, the humans that interact with the vehicle move further towards complete on-the-loop 
interaction with the UAV. Capabilities beyond flight control surface movements have to 
be automated. A human may send a command to the UAV to fly into an area, but once 
communication is severed, the UAV must be capable of determining the route to fly. 
Further, because the UAV has a mission beyond just flying, processes performed by 
sensor operators must also be automated. A vehicle that can determine and control its 
own flight path is of no use other than providing a distraction on an adversary’s radar 
screen unless it can operate its own onboard sensors and eventually provide input to the 
overall battle space. If sensor interpretation is not included in the system’s capabilities 
but instead has only sensor data storage, one or many human sensor operators will have 
to interpret the raw data into useful information once communication is reestablished. 
This can be cumbersome for the operators, and in situations where time is critical, it can 
delay operations that will use the information. 
Advances in automation have shown the ability to improve processes and 
potentially reduce human workload. A growing field of research even aims to produce 
systems that can perform human “thinking” or cognitive functions. While these advances 
in computer programming may produce promising results through the execution of 
complex algorithms, humans still have to interact with the technology at some level. 
Because humans and “smart” machines are different, the interface space between the 
human and machine is a critical area of concern. There exists a need for humans in the 
interaction to accept the machine’s processes as acceptable for task completion. If not, 
the machine will not be used as it was intended or possibly not used at all. Applying 
automation in human-machine systems requires the humans in the interaction to trust the 
automation. This thesis investigates the importance of trust in a human-machine system 
that includes processes that are carried out by automation substituting the processes of a 
human. 
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C. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 
The objective of this investigation is to develop trust need statements and system 
requirements that are traceable to functions in a process performed by a human-
automation system. This is performed by leveraging and applying the findings of a 
thorough literature review to the functional process model of an “autonomous” aerial 
vehicle system conducting an intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) mission 
with the goal of positively identifying a vessel at sea. The model functions are 
categorized as either reasoning or non-reasoning functions performed by the system 
without communicating with a human. With the functions categorized, each were 
assessed for potential impacts on human trust. Finally, based on the trust evaluations, 
system capability needs and corresponding system requirements were developed. 
D. THESIS ASSUMPTIONS 
The following assumptions apply to the “autonomous” aerial system used in this 
study: 
 Automation is fielded with a defined mission. There is no intent in this 
study to imply that the system creates its own mission. Automation is used 
to augment an existing manned system or tele-operated UAV. 
 The limitations set forth in DOD Directive 3000.09 will not be violated. 
Specifically, the capabilities allowed by the directive will scope the 
process model that is used in this work. DOD Directive 3000.09 states that 
“systems that are onboard or integrated with unmanned platforms must be 
designed such that, in the event of degraded or lost communications, the 
system does not autonomously select and engage individual targets or 
specific target groups that have not been previously selected by an 
authorized human operator.” (2012, 3) 
E. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
The following is a brief description of each chapter included in this work and 
provides a synopsis of the contents of each chapter as well as an overview of the thesis 
developments. 
The current chapter introduces the area of investigation and identifies thesis 
objectives and assumptions. Chapter II is a literature review into the how the terms 
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automation, autonomy, autonomous, and automated are used to describe human-machine 
systems and how their use can affect capability descriptions and design. Chapter III 
investigates what trust is and how trust can affect the use of automation as well as 
identifying where trust in automation plays a role in system design. Chapter IV describes 
the process for identifying ships through use of a functional model and identifies the 
functions in the process where automation replaces human functions. Chapter V analyzes 
the process functions defined in Chapter IV for trust needs based on the findings in 
Chapter III and develops trust requirements for the modeled process. Chapter VI 




II. AUTOMATION AND AUTONOMY DEFINITIONS 
The use of the words “automated,” “automation,” “autonomy” and “autonomous” 
are sometimes used in place of each other to describe the same subject. Generally, each 
of the terms are used in reference to a system that includes a computer sub-system that 
can perform processes on its own with limited to no human direction. While replacing 
any of the terms with another may be acceptable in day-to-day conversation, the same is 
not true when considering writing requirements for military acquisition. Various 
publications recognize the importance of the use of the words and provide specific 
guidance on their meaning. However, when investigating published literature on the same 
subjects, the terms automated system or automation, and autonomous system or 
autonomy are used differently. This chapter will survey the various uses of the terms and 
provide a summary for their use within this thesis. 
The literature survey begins with publicly released Department of Defense 
directives and reports. 
A. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PUBLICATIONS 
One specific area in which the definitions for automated systems and autonomous 
systems are of clear concern is in their use when describing a weapons system. The 
Department of Defense Directive 3000.09, Autonomy in Weapons Systems, released in 
2012 provides guidance in the following definition: 
Autonomous weapon system. A weapon system that, once activated, can 
select and engage targets without further intervention by a human 
operator. This includes human-supervised autonomous weapons systems 
that are designed to allow human operators to override operation of the 
weapon system, but can select and engage targets without further human 
input after activation. (Department of Defense 2012, 13–14) 
This definition’s key point is that autonomous weapons systems can select to 
engage targets; that is, the choice is made by the system not the human. The definition 
allows for systems that are monitored by a human who has the authority to deselect 
targets or stop the engagement process, but the human does not have a “vote” in the 
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initial decision to select an object for engagement. The directive defines human-
supervised autonomous weapons systems as those “designed to provide human operators 
with the ability to intervene and terminated engagements” (Department of Defense 2012, 
14). While specific to weapons systems, these definitions imply that a non-human system 
that can make decisions infers that system is an autonomous system. 
The DOD directive gives further guidance in its definition of semi-autonomous 
weapons systems. They are defined as weapon systems “that, once activated, [are] 
intended to only engage individual targets or specific target groups that have been 
selected by a human operator” (Department of Defense 2012, 14). According to the 
directive, the sole function that makes a weapons system less than an autonomous one is 
that “human control is retained over the decision to select individual targets and specific 
targets for engagement” (Department of Defense 2012, 14). 
The definitions provided by the DOD directive are intended to give guidance to 
the design and development of armed systems, but the clear distinction between 
autonomous and semi-autonomous relies on a specific decision capability. The views 
expressed by the directive indicate that there is a specific point in which systems are 
classified differently. While the terms automated and automation are not used to 
distinguish the differences, other DOD resources do use these terms for comparison. 
Prior to the release of DOD Directive 3000.09, the Defense Science Board (DSB) 
released an information-gathering report identifying roles of and gaps in the current and 
future use of autonomous systems. The report begins by defining autonomy as “a 
capability (or set of capabilities) that enables a particular action of a system to be 
automatic or, within programmed boundaries, ‘self-governing’” (Defense Science Board 
2012, 1). The definition is purposeful in its use of the word capability. Within the study, 
“the task force reviewed many of the DOD-funded studies on “levels of autonomy” and 
concluded that they are not particularly helpful to the autonomy design process” (Defense 
Science Board 2012, 4). The argument that the DSB puts forth is that systems that 
include autonomy (a capability) should not be defined based on how much, or which 
functions are allocated to a computer. The report suggests that a level definition leads to 
an assumption that “there are discrete levels of intelligence for autonomous systems, and 
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that classes of vehicle systems can be designed to operate at a specific level for the entire 
mission” (Defense Science Board 2012, 4). 
The 2012 DSB report advocates deserting levels of autonomy (or levels of 
automation as will be discussed later in this chapter) as metrics of measure for system 
design. The report acknowledges that “system autonomy is a continuum from complete 
human control of all decisions” (Defense Science Board 2012, 4) to a level in which 
much of the deciding is done by a computer-based system that may or may not be 
supervised by a human at a very high level. In the author’s view, it is not that automation 
level descriptions are not valuable, but instead that using the levels as overall system 
descriptions is not. The intent is to avoid writing requirements that indicate a system shall 
be designed to a specific autonomy level. This can lead to designs that focus too much 
attention on the computer in the machine, instead of on the “collaborative” human-
machine system and also implies that the computer can have a “discrete levels of 
intelligence” (Defense Science Board 2012, 4). 
It is worth noting that the DSB uses the word “intelligence” in their argument for 
not using levels to describe autonomous systems. This gives the implication that 
autonomy over automation involves a system that determines or decides to perform an 
action; one that is able to perform cognitive or thinking (intelligence-based) functions. 
This is similar to DOD Directive 3000.09 on weapons systems in the view of decision 
making without human input. As with the DOD directive, the DSB report indicates that 
autonomy is different from automation. 
Another Defense Department report specifically identifies a difference in 
automation and autonomy. In May 2015 the DOD Office of Research & Engineering’s 
Autonomy Community of Interest released a report focusing on Test & Evaluation and 
Verification and Validation challenges for automated and/or autonomous systems. Their 
definitions are directly from an Air Force Research Laboratory strategy report (Masiello) 
and are: 
Automation: The system functions with no/little human operator 
involvement; however, the system performance is limited to the specific 
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actions it has been designed to do. Typically, these are well-defined tasks 
that have predetermined responses (i.e., simple rule-based responses). 
Autonomy: The system has a set of intelligence-based capabilities that 
allows it to respond to situations that were not pre-programmed or 
anticipated (i.e., decision-based responses) prior to system development. 
Autonomous systems have a degree of self-government and self-directed 
behavior (with the human’s proxy for decisions). (2013, 3) 
These definitions, like the previous definitions, note that the ability to carry out 
intelligence-based or cognitive functions is what distinguishes autonomy. These specific 
definitions go further by implying that autonomous system decision making replaces 
human decision making. If the function is completed by using a model that represents a 
human’s reasoning process, the system has autonomy. For the process to be defined 
under automation, no thinking or deciding is modeled. Instead the system just follows a 
series of steps to complete a task without deciding to complete it, or “think” or “reason” 
about how to complete it. 
The most recently released DOD publication regarding automation and autonomy 
from the Defense Department was released in August 2016. The Defense Science Board 
Summer Study on Autonomy summary begins with the acknowledgement that “autonomy 
has many definitions and interpretations. For this reason, the report begins with an 
introductory section that defines the term and its context for the purposes of this study” 
(Defense Science Board 2016, 3). The given definition states that “autonomy results from 
delegation of a decision to an authorized entity to take action within specific boundaries. 
An important distinction is that systems governed by prescriptive rules that permit no 
deviations are automated, but they are not autonomous” (Defense Science Board 2016, 
4). 
Again the distinction between automated and autonomous lays in the ability of a 
system to make decisions. This report, however, implies that autonomy constitutes both 
automated and autonomous capabilities. The distinction continues with the DSB citing a 
presentation by L.G. Shattuck who uses a definition from the Institute for Human & 
Machine Cognition (IHMC): “to be autonomous, a system must have the capability to 
independently compose and select among different courses of action to accomplish goals 
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based on its knowledge and understanding of the world, itself, and the situation” 
(Defense Science Board 2016, 4). If the system has prescriptive rules related to the 
decision making then the system is not autonomous; if there are no such rules, the system 
is autonomous. However, the DSB continues, citing Bradshaw et al. (2013, 57) that “no 
machine–and no person–is truly autonomous in the strict sense of the word” (Defense 
Science Board 2016, 5) and that the report would use the word autonomous to describe 
capabilities and not systems. 
Lastly, the Department of Defense Assistant Secretary of Defense Office for 
Research and Engineering in their 2015 technical assessment on autonomy considers the 
use of automation and autonomy effectively the same. In a footnote for their description 
of the broad fields of autonomy (DOD Research and Engineering) they state: 
While some in the field draw a distinction between automation as more 
rigid and autonomy as able to operate under higher level of complexity or 
uncertainty, we do not differentiate between the two because the 
distinction falls away when viewing them as enablers of DOD capabilities. 
Even if there is a difference of degree between them, they both perform 
the same function of enabling non-human decisions and actions. (2015, 1) 
This view is primarily held because the amount of automation (or autonomy) can 
change for the same system depending on the functions in the process that are being 
completed and how much or where human interaction exists. 
Recapping the Defense Department publications, the consensus is that automation 
and autonomy are different when describing systems. When describing high-level 
military capabilities, the view is that the two terms and their derivatives do not add value 
to defining a capability need. 
At high levels of description, autonomy and automation may very well both just 
be enablers of a desired capability as the DOD Office of Research and Engineering states. 
However, the terms matter when the human-machine interactions are described and 
interfaces are designed. What a system can do and with how much authority must be 
understood by the humans involved in the interaction. Describing the functions as 
automated or autonomous to the human can give differing perceptions, especially when 
the function carried out is replacing a human cognitive process. 
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The DOD literature is not all that drives the understanding and development of 
systems that are automated or autonomous. The definitions shown thus far both have 
similarities and differences to descriptions offered by other sources discussed next. 
B. NON-DOD PUBLICATIONS FROM HUMAN FACTORS, ERGONOMICS 
AND COGNITION FIELDS OF STUDY 
The following examples investigate non-DOD specific literature on how 
automation and autonomy are defined. 
According to T. Sheridan, one of the most widely cited authors on the subject of 
humans and automation, the “term’s [automation] first use is traceable to a 1952 
Scientific American article” (Sheridan 2002, 9). In his book Humans and Automation, he 
cites three definitions for automation from the Oxford English Dictionary and provides a 
breakdown of each of the three before expressing his own three-point “contemporary” 
definition: 
Automation refers to (a) the mechanization and integration of the sensing 
of environmental variables (by artificial sensors); (b) data processing and 
decision making (by computers); and (c) mechanical action (by motors or 
devices that apply forces on the environment) or “information action” by 
communication of processed information to people. (Sheridan 2002, 9) 
This definition does not put boundaries on how little or how much “processing 
and decision making” must occur to consider a system automated. In fact, “processing” 
and “decision making” can be very different capabilities. Processing can imply the ability 
to sort data. Decision making can imply having the ability to choose from available (or 
collected) data. Processing can also imply having the ability to understand data. 
Likewise, decision making can imply comparing data. While different implications are 
clear, the definition is not complete without understanding Sheridan’s view on how 
automation is characterized when the automation and human interact. 
In 1978 Sheridan, along with Verplank, published a table titled: Levels of 
Automation in Man-Computer Decision-Making (Sheridan and Verplank 1978, 8–17) in 
their work on tele-operating an undersea vehicle. Using ten levels, the table describes 
how the human-automation interaction can vary. At level one, the human tells the 
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computer what and how to do everything. At level ten, the computer does everything, if it 
decides to, and tells the human that the process is complete, again if it (the computer) 
decides to tell the human. The intent of the table is “for stating what effect the inclusions 
of certain hardware or computer-based features” (Sheridan and Verplank 1978, 8–15) 
would have on the interaction space at the human-machine interface. 
Sheridan’s ten levels of automation are slightly modified in Humans and 
Automation to eight “degrees of automation” (Sheridan 2002, 62). The updated, simpler 
scale aims to join similar actions described in the ten levels and changes the wording for 
each of the degrees to emphasize the interaction between the human and the machine 
(computer). Both scales are models used to describe the range in which interactions 
change when different tasks are given to automated machines. 
It is the author’s view that the levels, or degrees, of automation developed by 
Sheridan were not intended to be used as “design to” levels but instead to be used as 
guidelines to describe the control level of the automated machine and the communication 
that occurs between the human and machine as automation processes are increased. In the 
DSB’s 2012 Task Force Report: The Role of Autonomy in DOD Systems, the authors 
recommend that the DOD should “abandon the use of levels of autonomy” (Defense 
Science Board 2012, 4) because in their view the levels place too much attention on the 
machine design and not on the human-machine interaction (Defense Science Board 2012, 
4). The report specifically makes mention of Sheridan’s levels of automation in its 
assessment (DSB 2012, 23–24). Their wording agrees with the author’s assertion that the 
levels should not be used as “design to” levels or as a categorical description for an entire 
system. However, the use of levels or degrees can be useful to help describe the desired 
roles the non-human and human actors in the system fill but, the numbering scheme with 
the descriptions is not useful. The numbers give the implication of static states along the 
automation continuum. Additionally, the use of the word automation instead of autonomy 
in Sheridan’s work is notable because he does not establish a difference. 
Sheridan is not alone in describing these systems with the word automation. 
Parasuraman and Riley, both also widely cited authors on the subject of humans and 
automation, use the term as well. Their definition follows a similar vein as Sheridan’s: 
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We define automation as the execution by a machine agent (usually a 
computer) of a function that was previously carried out by a human. What 
is considered automation will therefore change with time.…Today’s 
automation could very well be tomorrow’s machine. (Parasuraman and 
Riley 1997, 231) 
From this definition, automation is anything that a machine does that replaces a 
human. This wide definition would include both of Masiello’s definitions on automation 
and autonomy mentioned before. Using this definition also includes Sheridan’s view on 
automation and the description of the different levels. Parasuraman and Riley, unlike 
Sheridan, use the word autonomy to help describe automation, in a model format. 
Citing previous work by Riley, automation levels are described by the intersection 
of “intelligence” and autonomy (Parasuraman and Riley 1997, 232). The model (Riley 
1989, 126) uses seven intelligence levels that range from “raw data” in which no 
processing is conducted to “operator predictive” in which operator actions and errors are 
anticipated. The autonomy scale has 12 levels ranging from “none” to “autonomous,” 
indicating that the automation has varying levels of self-control. From Riley’s model, 
automation is something that is designed. The automation is given a certain amount of 
“intelligence” or ability to perform actions, and it has a certain level of autonomy that 
describes the amount of control the automation has in performing the intelligent action. 
Riley’s model does not necessarily disagree with Masiello’s definitions as they 
are written. The “intelligent” functions are performed by the automation while the 
capability to perform these functions with or without human interaction is described by 
autonomy. Conceivably, one could design a system with varying levels of automation and 
autonomy at different times. The functional processes (in many cases carried out by the 
execution of computer code) can be designed to any given level of automation, and 
depending on the desired capability, varying levels of autonomy can be afforded to the 
system to carry out the processes. 
Continuing their investigations into levels and types of interaction between 
humans and machines and how function allocation can be described, Parasuraman and 
Sheridan joined with Wickens and wrote an article for IEEE in May 2000. Within the 
article a familiar, yet slightly modified, definition for automation is used and the use of 
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levels to describe interactions between humans and automation is again provided but also 
updated. Here, they define automation as “a device or system that accomplishes (partially 
or fully) a function that was previously, or conceivably could be, carried out (partially or 
fully) by a human operator” (Parasuraman et al. 2000, 287). The definition is very similar 
to Parasuraman and Riley’s 1997 definition. 
The levels provided in the IEEE article follow a similar style to Sheridan’s 
previously published levels and are labeled as the Levels of “Automation of Decision and 
Action Selection” (2000, 287). The description of the levels here however, are described 
as “representing increased autonomy of the computer over the human action” 
(Parasuraman et al. 2000, 287) based on Sheridan and Verplank’s original ten level scale. 
The terms automation and autonomy are used similarly to Riley’s use for autonomy and 
Sheridan’s use for automation. Instead of separating the two as different, autonomy is 
used to describe the role that the automation takes in the human-automation interaction. 
Parasuraman et al. continue by reiterating that automation levels do not remain constant 
for all processes the automation performs. They illustrate this by modeling a high-level 
functional process of information processing. In their four-step process, which is 
fashioned after a very simplified model of a human information processing method, they 
show how automation levels can vary across information acquisition, information 
analysis, decision selection and action implementation (Parasuraman et al. 2000, 288). 
The example model agrees with the DSB assertion that levels should not be used to 
describe systems as a whole. However, to properly describe the task distribution between 
computers and human in each process, the level descriptions are beneficial to 
highlighting what capabilities are designed into the system. 
The Parasuraman et al. definition has been used by others. Most notably, and 
relevant to the research of this thesis is Madhavan and Weigmann’s 2007 work that 
compares human-human trust to human-automation trust. Because of their topic, the 
definition used considers automation the full or partial replacement of functions that are 
carried out by a human (Madhavan and Weigmann 2007, 279). Another widely cited 
work by Lee and See concerning trust in automation, defines automation as “technology 
that actively selects data, transforms information, makes decisions, or controls processes” 
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(Lee and See 2004, 50). This definition infers self-governance much like other definitions 
of autonomy.  
Depending on the source, automation and autonomy can be used to describe the 
same, or distinctly different types of systems. One common theme that stands out 
however, is that automation is typically used to describe system functions, while 
autonomy is used to describe system capability. Still, when considering the development 
of systems for military use, and specifically the writing of requirements, the use of these 
terms can matter. Their use also matters when developing training and operating 
literature for the people that will interact with these systems. 
C. SUMMARY 
The system, no matter how automatic, self-governing, or intelligent, will always 
at some level, interact with a human. The author agrees with the DSB and Bradshaw et al. 
that no system that is developed is ever fully autonomous. Through design, systems can 
perform a variety of functions spanning multiple levels of description with differing 
levels of authority to start, stop, continue or potentially to modify how or when the 
functions are performed. These are unique characteristics of these advanced systems.  
This thesis will use the term automation to describe the functions an advanced 
non-human system performs. Autonomy will be used to describe how much oversight or 
direction is or is not exercised by the human on the advanced system. More autonomy 
refers to less oversight or direction and vice versa.  
The system used in the analyses within this thesis is characterized as an 
“autonomous” aerial system. The intent of this thesis is to investigate where and how 
trust factors into the design of the automation in the “autonomous” aerial system so that 
the system will be correctly used and relied on. The next chapter investigates trust in 
automation. 
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III. TRUST IN AUTOMATION 
This chapter addresses trust and its importance in automation. As systems include 
more advanced functionality the interactions between humans and the automation, as well 
as the allocation of the functions, in the system changes. Trust becomes a key need in 
these systems because of the changes. Parasuraman (1997, 236) affirms, “trust often 
determines automation usage.” Similarly, Sheridan (2002, 77) states that “trust is now 
considered an important factor in human-automation performance.” The changes in the 
functional roles and the interactions cause differing perceptions and expectations of the 
automation by the human. The need for trust in human-machine military systems is 
identified as a major challenge by the Department of Defense Research & Engineering’s 
Autonomy Community of Interest on Test and Evaluation, Verification and Validation 
(ATEVV) working group in their 2015 Technology Investment Strategy Report. 
Identified as current challenge 4, the ATEVV writes: 
Handoff, communication, and interplay between operator and autonomy 
become a critical component to the trust and effectiveness of an 
autonomous system. … When [modeling and simulation] is not possible at 
design time, how can trust in the system be ensured, what factors need to 
be addressed, and how can transparency and human-machine system 
requirements for autonomy be defined? (Department of Defense 2015b, 4) 
To determine what requirements are needed to build trust into these systems, an 
investigation into what trust is and what can influence a human’s trust in automation is 
needed. 
A. DEFINING TRUST IN AUTOMATION 
A large body of work exists concerning trust in automation. Much of the 
published work investigates the factors that affect trust in human-human relationships 
and applies, or attempts to apply, the findings to human-machine relationships. Lee and 
See, paraphrasing others, state, “Sheridan (1975) and Sheridan and Hennessy (1984) 
argued that just as trust mediates relationships between people, it may also mediate the 
relationship between people and automation” (Lee and See 2004, 51). This cross agent 
assertion that factors affecting trust in human-human relationships can be used to 
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determine factors affecting trust in human-automation relationships is useful. However, it 
should not be stated that trust in the human-human relationship is the same as trust in the 
human-automation relationship. Humans and machines are different. While they are 
different, one actor in the relationship is a human; therefore, understanding factors that 
affect trust in the human-human relationship are beneficial to determining factors in the 
human-automation relationship. 
Before determining the factors that affect trust, the roles of the human and the 
automation in the relationship must be assigned. A relationship in the simplest form 
requires two actors, and when considering trust, the actors can be labeled the Trustor and 
the Trustee. For the simplest human-automation relationship the Trustor is the human and 
the Trustee is the autonomous system. Generally, trust in this relationship is directional; 
the Trustor exercises trust (or lack of trust) in the Trustee. 
To describe one way in which a Trustor exercises trust in the Trustee, Lee and See 
(2004) summarize the conclusions of several other researchers that focus on trust as an 
attitude or expectation of the Trustor in the Trustee. Each example identifies that the 
Trustor has a perception (preconceived or initial) of the Trustee. The Trustor expects and 
depends on a certain response or action from the Trustee. Lee and See identify through 
comparison of the examples that “trust concerns an expectancy or an attitude regarding 
the likelihood of favorable responses” (Lee and See 2004, 53). Madhavan and Weigmann 
(2007, 280), like Lee and See, also encapsulate some of the more widely cited sources on 
trust. Their summary states: “Trust refers to the expectation of, or confidence in, another 
and is based on the probability that one party attaches to co-operative or favourbale [sic] 
behaviour [sic] by other parties” (Barber 1983, Muir 1987, Hwang and Buergers 1997). 
From these examples it is implied that trust in automation is an attitude that the human 
(Trustor) has toward the automation (Trustee) based on the what the trustor expects or 
believes the automation will do in a given situation. However, an additional approach in 
describing trust is common that does not describe trust as an attitude. 
Instead of describing trust as an attitude of the Trustor based on the Trustee’s 
actions, trust has also been explained as an intention or willingness to act in uncertainty. 
Again summarizing some widely cited definitions on trust, Lee and See identify that 
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many authors identify “vulnerability” as a critical element of trust. For trust to be an 
important part of a relationship, individuals must willingly put themselves at risk or in 
vulnerable positions by delegating responsibility for actions to another party” (2004, 53). 
The vulnerability approach to trust describes trust as an intended behavior of the Trustor. 
Further still, Lee and See identify that “some authors go beyond intention and 
define trust as a behavioral result of vulnerability or risk (Deutsh, 1960; Meyer, 2001)” 
(2004, 53). This definition explains trust as an outcome produced by the vulnerability of 
the Trustor. Therefore, depending on which group of authors one reads, trust is either a 
belief, an attitude, an intention, or a behavior. Lee and See perfectly point out that “these 
distinctions are of great theoretical importance, as multiple factors mediate the process of 
translating beliefs and attitudes into behaviors” (Lee and See 2004, 53). The Defense 
Science Board Summer Study on Autonomy, quoting Hoffman et al. (2013, 84), also 
correctly acknowledges that “trust is complex and multidimensional” (Defense Science 
Board 2016, 14) Investigating the literature shows that this is clearly true. 
Thankfully, Lee and See’s investigation into trust does not stop at identifying the 
inconsistencies that are found in the body of literature. They continue by using Ajzen and 
Fishbein’s Theory of Reasoned Action to help resolve differences in the identified 
definitions of trust. In the Theory of Reasoned Action, behaviors are described as the 
results of a person’s intentions, and their intentions are effects of attitudes. A person’s 
attitudes are influenced and formed by their beliefs, perceptions and knowledge (Lee and 




Behaviors are the result of intentions, which are functions of attitudes that are influenced 
by beliefs, perceptions and knowledge. 
Figure 1.  A Generalized Model of Ajzen and Fishbein’s Theory of Reasoned 
Action. Adapted from Ajzen (2007). 
Using the Theory of Reasoned Action allows for addressing the inconsistencies 
observed in the definitions used for trust by investigating reliance in a system and how 
reliance and trust are related. Lee and See assert that “trust stands between beliefs about 
the characteristics of the automation and the intention to rely on the automation” (Lee and 
See 2004, 54). Agreeing with this assertion, the author provides the following statement 
that adds on to that used by Lee and See; it is used as the definition for trust in the 
remainder of this thesis. 
Trust is the attitude of a human, developed from beliefs, perceptions and 
knowledge of a system’s functional capabilities, towards the behavior of 
reliance in the system’s actions to achieve the human defined goals in 
situations characterized by uncertainty and vulnerability.  
From the definition, trust influences behavior; and, human behavior is one of the 
many considerations Human Factors Engineering (HFE) practitioners investigate when 
designing for human use (Lockett and Powers 2003, 463). In Chapter II, it was stated that 
no system is ever fully autonomous; a human will interact with and use the automation. 
Therefore, HFE considerations, and thus trust, are important to the system design. The 
following section discusses a few of the more widely cited investigations into trust in 
automation. 
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B. INVESTIGATIONS INTO TRUST IN AUTOMATION 
The behavior of reliance on automation has been investigated. Parasuraman 
(1997, 236) cites two examples in which reliance, or perceived reliability, is related to a 
person’s trust through examples of empirical studies. In the first example, Parasuraman 
cites a study performed by Muir (1988) on the use of an automated aid to control a 
simulated beverage manufacturing plant (1997, 236). He discusses how Muir argues that 
if a system is perceived as honest and trustworthy, then a person’s trust is positively 
affected, and the person will rely on the system. Similarly, if the person experiences let 
down or betrayal (a belief that the system is not as reliable as originally thought), then the 
person’s trust is negatively affected, and the system is relied on less. Muir also argues 
that if trust has been negatively affected, it takes time to reestablish (Parasuraman 1997, 
236). 
The second example referenced by Parasuraman (1997, 237) and also by 
Madhavan and Weigmann (2007, 284) summarizes the findings of Lee and Morray 
(1992). Lee and Morray (1992) performed an experiment that investigated the 
relationship between trust and control strategies for humans interacting with a semi-
automatic pasteurization plant. The analysis on their experiment, like Muir’s (1988), 
showed a correlation between subjective trust and reliance on automation. In a 
subsequent study, Lee and Moray (1994) later determined that conditions in which a 
person has the ability to choose to perform a task or to allow an automated machine 
perform the same task, reliance on the automation is higher when trust is higher 
(Parasuraman 1997, 237). The findings in Lee and Morray’s (1994) study also indicate 
that a person’s self-confidence in their own ability to complete a task affects the reliance 
that is placed on a machine completing the same task (Parasuraman 1997, 237). They 
found that trust in the automated machine is higher when the perception of one’s own 
ability to complete the task was lower than the perception of the automated system’s 
ability. Additionally, the opposite was found to be true; if one’s own self-confidence in 
task completion is high, then the automation would not be used. 
According to the research performed by Muir (1988) and Lee and Moray (1992), 
if the beliefs and perceptions a human has towards an automated system’s performance 
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and reliability are affected negatively, trust in automation is slow to recover if trust 
recovers at all. On the other hand, Parasuraman (1997, 237) provides an example study 
by Riley (1994) in which the slow recovery of trust does not occur. Describing Riley’s 
findings, he explains: the operators “did not delay turning on automation after a recovery 
from a failure [of the system]; in fact, many participants continued to rely on the 
automation during the failure.” Additionally, Parasuraman in his own investigative study 
with others (Parasuraman et al. 1994) found similar results; that participants continue to 
rely on the system’s automation even after the system failed. 
Parasuraman’s examples do not necessarily contradict the example shown by Lee 
and See. Instead they both highlight the importance of beliefs, perceptions and 
knowledge and how they affect trust and reliance on automation. The studies show that 
the attitude of trust is scalable. Based on perceptions, beliefs and knowledge, conditions 
of distrust and over trust can be reached resulting in the rejection of automation or over-
reliance in automation respectively. Parasuraman and Riley’s 1997 article titled “Human 
and Automation: Use, Misuse, Disuse, Abuse,” provides multiple examples of these 
undesirable cases. 
These extremes imply that the attitude of trust must be calibrated to the system’s 
capabilities for a human to rely on it appropriately. Parasuraman and Riley state, “If 
automation is to be used appropriately, potential biases and influences on this decision [to 
use or not use automation] should be recognized by training personnel, developers, and 
managers” (1997, 238). 
C. CALIBRATING TRUST IN AUTOMATION 
Lee and See (2004, 55) provide a description that explains the connection 
between trust and automation capability (trustworthiness). They use the term resolution to 
describe “how precisely a judgment of trust differentiates levels of automation capability 
(Cohen et al. 1999).” The goal in using automation is to align the human’s trust with the 
capability of the system, or achieve calibrated trust where “trust matches system 
capabilities, leading to appropriate use” (Lee and See 2004, 55). What their description 
does not directly show is that the human’s trust level is influenced by the perception, 
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belief, or knowledge of the system’s “trustworthiness.” This is an important factor. While 
trust calibration can be defined by the appropriate intersection of trust level range and 
system capability range, one must be careful not to assume that a high level of capability 
results in a high level of trust or visa-versa. Instead, the description highlights a goal or 
result space. When considering a system with a certain set of capabilities, designers must 
aim to influence the human’s trust level to a calibrated level by influencing the beliefs, 
perceptions and knowledge of the system’s capabilities. 
The system capabilities must be clearly explained to, and understood by, the 
human that will interact with it in order to influence the human’s beliefs, perceptions and 
knowledge of the system. The methods in which actions are performed, and how the 
system will respond to errors must also be understood. Finally, the human in the 
interaction must have a reason to expect that the autonomous system will perform its 
actions to meet the intended objective. The methods used to address these areas can vary. 
The humans that interact with an automated system can have diverse levels of 
knowledge, skills, and abilities. Humans will also have varying levels of experience 
interacting with differing levels of automated functionality in systems and may be 
predisposed initially to reject system process that differ from the status quo for a non-
automated process to complete the same action. Others may, on the other hand, be 
predisposed to accept the autonomous system blindly because of an impression that the 
system must be better than the status quo or else it would not be presented for use. 
Neither of these attitudes is desirable, especially in cases where automation is used in 
military operations, lifesaving operations, or other high-risk applications. 
It is imperative that actions are taken to calibrate trust in automation 
appropriately. As stated before, trust in human-system relationships is often derived from 
examples of trust in human-human relationships. However, “people are often thrust into 
relationships with automation in a way that forces trust to develop in a way different from 
that in many relationships between people” (Lee and See 2004, 67).  
Lee and See, summarized by Madhavan and Weigmann (2007, 280) identify that 
the performance, process and purpose, of the automation are bases that influence trust. 
That is, these three bases can influence the knowledge, beliefs and perceptions of the 
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human. Performance, both past and present, includes the automation’s reliability, 
predictability and ability. Process refers to the algorithms that the automation uses and 
how well they explain how the automation functions. Purpose refers to why the 
automation is designed. 
D. DESIGNING TO CALIBRATE TRUST IN AUTOMATION 
One sure way to affect the level of trust that people have when they interact with 
automation is through training. It has already been established that trust is influenced by 
the knowledge that a person has about the automated system. It should be expected that if 
a human is to interact with an automated system, that education and training are 
available, and often required, before any interaction with the automated system occurs. 
Education and training can give the human a baseline knowledge of the system’s 
performance, process and purpose. While important, education and training are not the 
only methods to affect a person’s trust attitude. Lee and See (2004, 67) agree: They state, 
“Thus, early in the relationship, trust can depend on purpose and not performance. The 
specific evolution depends on the type of information provided by the human-computer 
interface and the documentation and training” (emphasis added). 
The design of the automated system must allow for the calibrated trust attitude to 
remain calibrated. As mentioned before, it has been shown that a change in the human’s 
perception in the automated system based on the interaction experience can have 
undesirable effects on the trust attitude. This means that the knowledge gained from 
education and training, acquired before interacting with automation, is not by itself 
sufficient to keep trust calibrated and thus appropriately affect reliance. Lee and See 
state, “Like trust between people, trust in automation develops according to the 
information available, rather than following a fixed series of stages” (2004, 67). The 
interfaces that exist between the human and the automated machine are where 
information is made available which makes them critical points where trust must be 
addressed. 
The presentation of the material in an ergonomics sense is important. Lee and See 
address this when summarizing the findings on two studies into trust and credibility in 
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computing as follows: they state, “In many cases trust and credibility depend on surface 
features of the interface that have no obvious link to the true capabilities of the system 
(Briggs, Burford, and Dracup 1998; Tseng and Fogg, 1999)” (2004, 73). However, the 
interface must also take into consideration what the information is and how it was 
developed before determining how it is presented. Not all information equally carries the 
same trust needs. The best designed interfaces allow for information exchange in such a 
way that it aides in the proper calibration of trust. 
Depending on the capabilities of the automation, different types of information 
are exchanged at the human-automation interface. Information that is the result of 
working out equations is easily traceable and understood. Education and training often 
are sufficient to allow for information based on these calculations to be trusted when the 
results are presented. For example, one is taught in classical physics that speed (velocity) 
is the change of position over a given time. Even without calculus, one can be taught that 
the measured distance between two points divided by the elapsed time to move from the 
first point to the second will provide the speed of the moving object. This type of 
information is automatically calculated and displayed in a number of systems that 
humans interact with in everyday life. Such interfaces include speedometers used in 
personal vehicles and airspeed indicators as well as altimeters used in aircraft cockpits. 
Depending on the importance of the presented value to the human, the location and 
method of reporting matters but displaying or communicating the method of calculation 
is not necessary at the interface. Information that is solely based on equations with input 
variables obtained from the measurements of position, distance, time, pressure or 
temperature for example, only require the result of the equation to be reported. This, 
however, does not alleviate the need for error reporting. If the sensors used to collect the 
variable data, or the computer used to calculate the resultant information are damaged, or 
produce errors, the human must be informed at the interface. Unless the equation is 
chosen, or created by the computer, the knowledge of how the equation is calculated prior 
to interaction is sufficient to accept the reported value as true. 
Automation’s sole use is not to perform calculations and report results. 
Automation includes the employment of algorithms to replace thinking or reasoning type 
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actions that are normally performed by humans. The algorithms that are developed may 
provide very accurate results when compared to humans performing the same action; 
however, they are not exact replicas of the human’s process. They are instead 
abstractions created by a programmer. Some cognitive functions that are carried out by a 
machine’s algorithms may use the very same information that is expressed through the 
results of the aforementioned equations. Combining equation-based information through 
the use of algorithms is carried out through coded programs based on any number of 
matching or decision-making models and requires more than the final result to influence 
trust. The equation-based information may be clearly understood and accepted as 
accurate but, how and why the information is put together in an algorithm may not be 
fully understood by the human. Lack of understanding can lead to rejection, blind trust, 
or may cause confusion. 
In a human-human relationship, the Trustor may have an opportunity to ask the 
Trustee how a conclusion was ascertained and also may sense how much trust should be 
placed in the Trustee’s information based on the Trustee’s voice or body language 
(perception of the Trustee). In human-automation relationships the interaction does not 
allow for the same observations unless some sort of anthropomorphic features or process 
explanation are designed into the machine to emulate these observables. The algorithmic 
generated information then requires more than the final value or result in the exchange. 
The interface design must communicate information to the human in such a way 
that the human can determine if the presented information matches known and perceived 
machine capabilities and the situation. Lyons (2013) identifies the same necessity in one 
of his three models for human-robot transparency factors. He states, “the analytical model 
[for transparency] needs to communicate the underlying analytical principles used by the 
robot to make decisions” (Lynn 2013, 50). The human may not be able to query the 
automation how or why a presented solution was given in a traditional sense, and 
displaying the actual algorithmic steps requires knowledge of the chosen coding language 
and time that may not be afforded in many cases. Because of these limitations, it is 
imperative that the human-automation interfaces communicate algorithmic generated data 
in a descriptive manner that fits the operational relationship between the agents. For the 
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interface to communicate in this way, the automation processes that use such algorithms 
must be identified, and requirements must be written for the additional needed descriptive 
information beyond the algorithm result. 
In many uses of automation, the systems are not intended to be viewed as human-
like. Instead, these systems are viewed as advanced tools that humans use in a team 
setting. The system becomes an integral part of the team but is not necessarily a team 
member in the same respects that a human is a team member. In an investigation into the 
challenges of including the advanced systems that have been the topic of this chapter as 
team members, Klein et al. (2004) eloquently state that the development of these systems 
exists at a boundary between two schools of thought. The first is that these systems are 
developed with the goal of creating systems “that emulate human capabilities” (2004, 
94). The second being “to create systems that extend human capabilities, enabling people 
to reach into contexts that matter for human purposes” (2004, 94). In the author’s view, 
this boundary or “fine line” as described by Klein et al., can begin to be bridged with 
calibrating trust at the human-machine interface focusing on the information exchange 
that includes algorithmic generated data. 
E. SUMMARY 
In regards to trust in the human-automated system relationship, trust is an attitude 
that the human has toward relying on the automated system in an environment of 
vulnerability for use in reaching a goal. Trust must be calibrated such that humans will 
used automated systems appropriately within the system’s designed capabilities. The trust 
attitude exhibited by the human is variable. It is influenced by, and calibrated through the 
knowledge, perceptions and beliefs that the human has toward the automated system. The 
proper calibration of trust is executed by both training and through system design; neither 
alone can maintain the appropriate level of calibrated trust. Education can establish a 
baseline for the human’s trust attitude in the automation. Training and system design can 
aide in maintaining properly calibrated trust. System design affects trust at the human-
automation interfaces. The exchange of information at the interface and how the 
information is presented is key in addressing the human’s perceptions and beliefs about 
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the automation and hence influences trust. According to the Theory of Reasoned Action, 
the trust attitude will then affect the behavior of reliance. The type of information 
exchange at the interface carries differing trust needs. Information based on sensor data 
output and provable calculation alone, which are presented as values, influence the trust 
attitude through perception at the interface in an ergonomics sense and through 
knowledge of the equations used. Information based on the modeling of human decision 
making, cognitive processes, or matching algorithms influence the trust attitude through 
perception of their outputted results and also through knowledge and perception of the 
methods by which the results were developed. A need to communicate the methods along 
with the results exists. Therefore, the actions performed by automation in a system need 
to be defined and then scrutinized for how they can affect the human trust attitude. One 
method for doing this is through a functional analysis of the system (Lockett and Powers, 
2003, 469). 
The next chapter elaborates on the scenario introduced in Chapter I and uses a 
functional architecture to decompose and define the automation actions an “autonomous” 
aerial vehicle must perform it to complete the scenario mission. Chapter V then analyzes 
the actions for trust needs discussed in this chapter. 
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IV. IDENTIFYING AUTOMATION TRUST POINTS IN A 
FUNCTIONAL PROCESS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The first chapter of this thesis introduced a capability gap in using a UAV to 
extend the operational awareness of a ship at sea. The gap exists because the UAV relies 
on a communication link for the human operators to deliver flight guidance commands 
and also for tele-operating the onboard sensors. In order to bridge this capability gap with 
a ship-launched unmanned aerial system, it is necessary to include automation in the 
system. Operating beyond the communication link requires giving the system some 
amount of autonomy (within operational and design constraints) to control both flight 
functions and sensor operating functions. As described in Chapter II, all systems, 
regardless the “automation level” or how much autonomy the system has, at some point 
will interact with a human. A system designed to fill the capability gap, while given the 
authority to perform functions on its own, could never be fully autonomous. The system 
design and operating instructions are created by humans and are limited to the allowances 
of the programmed algorithms. 
Recognizing the necessity for increased automation in a system to fill the 
capability gap introduces issues of relying on the proposed system and accepting its 
ability to replace human operators. In Chapter III, reliance was described as a behavior 
that is influenced by trust, an attitude, through the application of the Theory of Reasoned 
Action. It was found that trust is influenced through the knowledge, beliefs, and 
perceptions the human has of the automation. According to Lee and See (2004), and 
summarized by Madhavan and Weigmann (2007, 280), the automation’s design can 
affect the knowledge, beliefs, and perceptions through the three bases: purpose, 
performance and process. 
For the proposed “autonomous” aerial vehicle, the purpose, or why the 
automation is designed (Madhavan and Weigmann 207, 208), is to conduct an 
Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) mission in place of a manned 
helicopter beyond the limits of a communication link. The human(s) interacting with the 
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automation must understand the automation’s purpose, and how the system functions will 
meet the purpose. Education and training prior to interaction with the system can affect 
the knowledge of the human and develop a trust foundation. This trust baseline will affect 
how the human uses the system. The purpose of the system must be known before use to 
expect proper use and proper beliefs in the system’s capabilities. 
The performance of the automation, defined by the ability of the automation to 
meet the purpose, and can be described by reliability and predictability (Madhavan and 
Weigmann 207, 208). Both knowledge of the reliability determined through test and 
evaluation of the system and the perceived reliability experienced through interaction 
with the automation will affect trust. Predictability of the automation’s functional 
sequence affects trust through perception. When, why, and in what order processes are 
completed must follow a sequence that is understood by the human interacting with the 
system. 
The process of the automation refers to the algorithms used to complete the 
functions. As described in Chapter III, the algorithms relate to knowledge, beliefs, and 
perceptions through more than the final result determined by the algorithm. Lee and See 
(2004) suggest that algorithms used in automation should be either simple, or revealed in 
such a way that they are comprehensible. A suggested method is to show intermediate 
results as the algorithm runs (2004, 74). For the proposed aerial system, revealing 
intermediate steps is not possible without a communication link. Furthermore, because 
the automation’s functions include those that are modeled after human cognitive 
processes, the algorithms used in the system would certainly be very complex. 
While complex, and inherently lacking the ability to have process transparency, 
explaining and communicating automation processes to users must still be addressed in 
the system design to allow proper calibration of user trust and reliance in the proposed 
system. This requires an investigation into the automation functions used to meet the 
desired capability. With the functions identified, points for simplification or for 
explanation can be identified, and design requirements that are specific to calibrating 
trust in the automation can be generated. While the human-automation interface is the 
point at which perception of the automation’s performance and process is affected, the 
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interface cannot do so without receiving the necessary information from the system. 
Where the information that affects trust is generated must be determined. 
The remainder of this chapter utilizes a functional architecture, modeled with 
Functional Flow Block Diagrams (FFBDs), to decompose the ISR mission. The FFBDs 
used are based on the functional architectures developed by Frau, et al. in “An 
Architecture for an Autonomous, Weaponized Unmanned Aerial System (UAS)” and by 
Hernandez, et al. in “MH-60 Seahawk / MQ-8 Fire Scout Interoperability” as well as the 
author’s own experience with manned aerial ISR missions. 
B. MISSION DESCRIPTION 
The mission for an aerial system was briefly introduced in Chapter I with the 
identification of the capability gap. A visual description of the desired mission capability 
is provided in Figure 2.  
 
An aerial vehicle is launched from a ship and flies beyond the Ship Sensor Horizon and 
communication ranges to independently search for and identify a vessel. After identifying 
a vessel, the air vehicle moves to reestablish communication and transmit the findings to 
the ship. This diagram is for informational purposes only and is not drawn to scale. 
Figure 2.  Mission Description Diagram 
The operational awareness of the crew on an air-capable ship sailing on the open 
ocean is limited to the sensor horizon of the ship’s onboard sensors and the available 
information that may exist in a tactical network from other ships or aircraft. To increase 
awareness beyond the sensor horizon, an aerial vehicle is launched on an ISR mission 
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with the specific purpose of locating and identifying other vessels. The aerial vehicle is 
unmanned and is capable of performing the ISR mission without constant communication 
with the ship. When a vessel is located and identified, the vehicle will reestablish 
communication and send a contact report to the ship. When mission time expires, or fuel 
load on the vehicle requires returning to the ship, the vehicle flies to the ship and lands. 
Without communication with the ship, the vehicle must utilize automation to 
navigate and maneuver, by interpreting the environment and controlling the vehicle on its 
own. The methods used by the automation to perform these capabilities undoubtedly 
require human understanding and calibrated trust for reliance in the system. However, 
even if these processes are adequately automated, understood, and trusted, automation 
must also be incorporated to operate vehicle sensors and also for interpreting the sensor 
data. The sensor data could arguably be stored in the vehicle’s computers and transmitted 
back to human sensor operators or data interpreters on the ship after the vehicle 
reestablishes a communication link. Yet, it would better resemble the current capability 
provided by manned helicopters if the vehicle could send back interpreted information. 
Automation in sensor employment and data interpretation are critical to meet the 
capability gap. Therefore, the process architecture will focus on the sensor and data 
interpretation functions the vehicle must perform. 
In Chapter I it was mentioned that a helicopter such as the MH-60R would 
typically be used for this type of ISR mission. The automation used to replace the 
helicopter then must, at a minimum, have the same sensor capabilities as the helicopter. 
No ship-launched UAV currently exists with the same sensor capabilities as the MH-60R. 
The purpose of this study is not to develop such a system. However, it would not be a 
stretch of the imagination to visualize such a vehicle. The current inventory of military 
UAVs includes systems that employ visual and infrared (IR) cameras, radars, and electro-
magnetic signature surveillance sensors. Therefore, for the purposes of this work, an 
assumption is made that the vehicle’s sensor suite includes a surface search radar, visual 
and IR capable cameras, an Electronic Support Measure (ESM) system, a data link, and a 
GPS system; all of which are systems installed on the MH-60R and are used in an ISR 
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mission. The vehicle also includes the necessary computers systems to operate the sensor 
suite. 
The described vehicle is not a typical UAV. Some of the human-machine 
interactions with the vehicle may at times be similar to those a system operator would 
have with a UAV; but, when operating without the communication link, the system is 
closer to the DOD Directive 3000.09 definition (US Department of Defense 2012, 14) of 
a semi-autonomous system. The literature review provided in Chapter II discussed the 
importance of properly and clearly using the terms autonomous and automation, so a 
description is warranted for this system that considers the terms. The system is an aerial 
vehicle that includes automation in its design and the algorithms used by the automation 
include those that represent human cognitive processes. The system is an Aerial Vehicle 
with Automated Cognitive Capabilities (AVACC). To distinguish the vehicle from 
existing UAVs and to avoid unintended perceptions that rise from the use of the term 
autonomous, the acronym AVACC will be used to describe the system and as the system 
name. 
The functional processes of the AVACC ISR mission to locate and identify 
vessels on the sea without a communication link are shown and described in the 
following sections of this chapter. Each decomposition level of the model is introduced in 
separate sections and the section headings include the model decomposition number 
scheme. The section numbers and letters do not follow the model numbering scheme. 
C. PERFORM ISR MISSION 
A model describing the high-level functions for the AVACC ISR mission is 
shown in Figure 3.  The model is adapted from models produced by Frau et al. (2011), 







High level functional description of Aerial Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Mission. 
Figure 3.  Perform ISR Mission High Level Functions 
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The entire functional process is not decomposed in this investigation. The purpose 
of the investigation is to identify functions in the process where human-automation trust 
needs exist. As mentioned before, the focus in this investigation is on the high-level 
function Perform Mission (A.7). The mission is expected to occur in an environment 
where communication with an authoritative boundary system (the ship) is not present. At 
the highest level, the model can be used to describe a large number of aerial vehicle 
missions. While the referenced projects influence the model, many of the similarities are 
due to the commonality in describing aerial vehicle operations. 
To perform any mission, a few prerequisite resources are needed. For the modeled 
process, a Mission Purpose and Intelligence Report must be provided to the first function, 
Conduct Pre-Mission Planning and Brief. The output from the Mission Brief function is 
Mission Data. The Mission Data is a required resource for the functions Load Mission, 
Ingress (Transit to Mission Area), and Perform Mission. One constraint for this overall 
process is that a mission has to exist. The AVACC does not search for or create missions. 
Much like a manned aircraft system, a purpose must be defined and sufficient data must 
be collected before establishing the need for a mission. For this investigation, an 
assumption is made that a mission exists and that the necessary information for a mission 
brief has been provided. It is possible that automated technology may aid in the mission 
development process, but that capability is beyond the scope of this investigation. 
In addition to the prerequisite items, the Perform Mission function (A.7) interacts 
with the function Maneuver in the Operational Area (A.8) through the resources Flight 
Computer Data and Maneuver Command. Because the system is intended to operate 
without communication, the AVACC must be capable of maneuvering for the mission 
and to reestablish communication with the ship. The Perform Mission function (A.7) does 
not include the functions required to maneuver the AVACC, but does create maneuvering 
needs based on observations, calculations and vessel identification. This is modeled with 
the output Maneuver Command from the Perform Mission function to the Maneuver in 
the Operational Area. Additionally, Flight Computer Data is used in Perform Mission sub 
functions. This data is created under the Maneuver in the Operational Area function 
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(A.8). The Maneuver in the Operational Area function (A.8) is not decomposed in this 
investigation. 
D. OVERVIEW OF PERFORM MISSION(S) (FUNCTION A.7) 
The Perform Mission function (A.7) of the process is based on the find, fix, track, 
target, engage, and assess (F2T2EA) kill chain that is a commonly used description for 
military system missions and is shown in Figure 4.  Per DOD directive 3000.09 (2012, 3), 
the AVACC cannot be used to select and engage targets on its own; and, the Perform 
Mission function (A.7) is completed beyond the communication range of the ship. 
Therefore, functions after and including Target are not decomposed in the model. 
 
Perform Mission is adapted from the common F2T2EA kill chain model. 
Figure 4.  Perform Mission (A.7) 
The F2T2EA process has been slightly modified. Find is replaced with Search 
Area, Fix is replaced with Detect, and the function Resolve Contacts is added. Search 
Area replaces Find because finding an object is the desired result of searching. The action 
that the AVACC performs is searching and the model intent is to show the actions 
(functions) that describe the mission process. Detect replaces Fix in the model because 
detecting an object, like Find, is also a result. A fix describes where in tactical space an 
object was detected. Find and Fix describe the intended results of functions where Search 
and Detect describe what is being done. Track is retained in this process because it is the 
action that the AVACC performs to follow the position and movement of a detected 
object. 
An object can be tracked without knowing what the object is and the object’s 
movement can help with refining a classification, but classification and identification are 
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separate actions. The function Resolve Contacts is added to describe how the actions of 
the tracked object is classified and identified. 
Even without the DOD Instruction 3000.09 (2012) prohibition for using the 
AVACC to select and engage targets, the resolution of contacts must occur and be trusted 
before continuing to the next step in the kill chain whether a human is involved or not. 
The next sections in this chapter decompose functions A.7.1 through A.7.4 in 
greater detail. 
E. SEARCH AREA (FUNCTION A.7.1) 
The AVACC must determine and verify its own position and also must determine 
where the High Value Unit (HVU) Critical Zones are while searching the mission area. 
The HVU Critical Zones are defined by the Intelligence Brief and are included in the 
Mission Data. They are specific sub areas in the greater Mission Area. If a vessel is found 
in an HVU Critical Zone, the HVU may need to change its operating scheme depending 
on the found vessel’s identification. In this scenario the only HVU is the “home” ship. 
How or why the ship would change its operating scheme is beyond the scope of this 
analysis. Multiple inputs and outputs are identified that influence the decomposition of 
Search Area and are shown in Figure 5.  
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Search Area (A.7.1) replaces Find in the common F2T2EA kill chain model. 
Figure 5.  Search Area (A.7.1) 
For the function Determine Self Position (A.7.1.1), the system’s position is 
determined with GPS Data as well as determining the time and distance from a previous 
known point; known as dead reckoning. With GPS or dead reckoning, the AVACC can 
use position, velocity and acceleration equations to determine where it is. Determine Self 
Position is a continuous function that is also included in the Navigate function, a sub 
function of Maneuver in the Operational Area (A.8) which is not decomposed in this 
investigation. The Flight Computer Data input comes from the Navigate function. 
Determining the location of the HVU Critical Zone (A.7.1.2) is important to the 
search process because the HVU Critical Zones refine and prioritize the AVACC’s 
search. Doctrine and Rules of Engagement should dictate how close any object should be 
allowed to come to the ship. This distance would be contained in the Mission Data 
created and loaded before the AVACC is launched and would establish the HVU Critical 
Zones. Once these determinations are made, the AVACC can search the Mission Area. 
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1. Decomposed Search Mission Area (Function A.7.1.3) 
For the AVACC to gather information, an area of interest, described and refined 
by the HVU Critical Zones and Mission Data, must be defined and an optimal search 
pattern must be determined before data collection is performed by the onboard sensors. 
Figure 6 shows this. 
 
Figure 6.  Search Mission Area (A.7.1.3) 
From the loaded Mission Data and the determination of the HVU Critical Zones, 
areas that need to be searched are determined (A.7.1.3.1). Priority would be determined 
in the mission load. In situ uploads could also be used as inputs to defining the search 
area(s) of interest if received before communication with the ship is lost. The receipt of 
the Airborne Mission Data updates would have to occur during the AVACC Ingress 
(Transit to the Mission Area) (A.6) while communication is still established. The 
resource is modeled as optional in this process because it is not required for the mission. 
It is possible for mission changes to occur after the AVACC is launched and the optional 
resource is modeled to show this. The purpose of showing the three inputs to the Define 
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Area of Interest function is to show that the AVACC is operating on an assigned mission. 
It does not have the capability of creating a mission on its own. 
The function Determine Optimal Search Pattern (A.7.1.3.2) is completed similarly 
to the method used to determine search and rescue search patterns. The Mission Data 
includes a starting point based on the HVU Critical Zones. The pattern is generated by 
running an optimization algorithm to cover the HVU Critical Zones. The same automated 
process is leveraged in manned aerial systems. 
The system sensors include an IR sensor, a radar, a visual sensor, and a passive 
EM sensor to actively and passively search the area (A.7.1.3.3) with priority given to the 
Critical Zones. 
F. DETECT (FUNCTION A.7.2) 
Objects in the mission area that meet sensor threshold criteria for positive 
detection are marked for further investigation. The overall Detect process is shown in 
Figure 7.  The Detect function is a prerequisite to and also a sub function of the later 
Track (A.7.3) function. 
 
Detect replaces Fix in the common F2T2EA kill chain Model 
Figure 7.  Detect (A.7.2) 
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Detect Objects in the Mission Area is decomposed further to describe what a 
detection is and how it is completed by the AVACC. The decomposition includes the 
sensors involved and the resource links to and from other functions. This is shown in the 
next section with Figure 8.  
1. Decomposed Detect Objects in the Mission Area (Function A.7.2.1) 
Each of the AVACC’s installed sensors have predetermined, designed thresholds 
when met, determine that a detection has occurred. These thresholds are set by the system 
capability requirements which are based on the intended use of the system. Once sensors 
are installed very limited adjustments can be made to the thresholds. Modes of sensor 
operation, for example radar scan rate, or visual and IR sensor optical zoom, can change a 
detection threshold. The detection criteria are determined by the mode and type of sensor 
in use. This describes the Define Detection Criteria function (A.7.2.1.1) in the 
decomposition of Detect Objects in the Mission Area shown in Figure 8.  
 
Figure 8.  Detect Objects in the Mission Area (A.7.2.1) 
Detect a Potential Object, function A.7.2.1.2, is decomposed further to show the 
sensors, sensor actions (functions), and information output from the sensor that defines a 
detection in Figure 9.  
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a. Detect a Potential Object (Function A.7.2.1.2) 
The functions describing Detect a Potential Object (A.7.2.1.2) are shown in 
Figure 9.  The sensor(s) that observe the detection create Detection Data which is used to 
create the initial Fix. 
Typically, radar, and to a lesser extent ESM, are used for initial detection. Optical 
and IR sensors are typically used to investigate existing detections when range to the 
detection is reduced. It is possible to use Optical sensors and IR sensors for initial 
detection, especially when observing for events such as fires, but in the case of searching 
for vessels at sea they are not the primary search sensor. 
 
Figure 9.  Detect a Potential Object (A.7.2.1.2) 
The selected sensors are typical for a manned ISR mission. In order to replace a 
manned aircraft system, the AVACC should have at a minimum, the same sensors 
installed to perform the ISR mission. 
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Detections from the ESM system (A.7.2.1.2.1) are triggered by receiving an 
electromagnetic (EM) signal that matches a signal of interest listed in a library file 
included in the mission load. This is no different than how ESM is used on manned 
aircraft. 
Radar generated detections (A.7.2.1.2.2) are no different than radar detections 
with a human operating the radar system. The radar transmits electromagnetic EM energy 
into space, the EM energy reflects off an object and returns to the radar receiver. If the 
reflected EM signal is above a designed threshold, a detection has occurred. 
Detections form the Visual/Optical (A.7.2.1.2.3) and the IR sensors (A.7.2.1.2.4) 
on the AVACC are different from those in manned systems. In the manned system, a 
human is alerted to the possibility of an object in view by observing the shapes and colors 
in the sensor’s display. In the AVACC, the sensor’s view would be scanned 
electronically for contrasting shapes or colors that meet a threshold defining a possible 
detection. A series of algorithms would be used to perform this function. Google™’s 
image recognition software in their Cloud Vision API is one example of how automation 
can utilize algorithms to interpret visual information. Google™’s methods use the 
Internet as a source to help with image interpretation. The AVACC would not be 
connected to the Internet, nor would it have a communication link, so it would need an 
onboard database for its algorithms to use for matching and comparing. 
b. Functions A.7.2.1.3–A.7.2.1.5 
Geo-locating the Detection Position (A.7.2.1.3), Determine Detection Range and 
Bearing from Self (A.7.2.1.4), and Categorize Detection by Sensor (A.7.2.1.5) occur in 
parallel after an object is detected. Geolocation describes where the detection is in tactical 
space using Sensor Data and GPS Data. The bearing and range are determined using the 
Self Position and Sensor Data. Lastly, the Sensor Data is used to categorize the detection 
as a Radar, EM, Visual, or IR detection. These three functions together comprise the 
Detection Data. 
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2. Functions A.7.2.2–A.7.2.6 
Following the Detect Objects in the Mission Area (A.7.2.1), the system assigns a 
type to the detection (A.7.2.2). This is modeled as an “OR” function as seen in Figure 7.  
The detection is either an initial detection or is associated with a contact that is already 
being tracked by the system. This distinction needs to be made because Detect (A.7.2) is 
also a sub function of Track (A.7.3). 
The first time an object is detected, its position is recorded in a database as a Fix. 
In a manned system this can be automated but is typically performed by a human 
operator interacting with an interface. The operator places a symbol on the tactical 
display at the detection location. The Fix records the position and time that the detection 
occurred. Without a human in the system a detection would automatically be “marked” 
with a fix (A.7.2.3). It may not necessarily be a physical mark on a structured plot. 
Instead, a data point is recorded to a database with detection latitude and longitude, the 
time of detection, and the sensor associated with the detection. 
A fix does not move. Therefore, the next step is in the processes is to create an 
entity that can move (A.7.2.4): a Contact. The Fix data is recorded (A.7.2.5) as the first 
data point for the contact. 
The outputted resource of the Detect process is the Initial Contact Data. This data 
is updated (A.7.2.6) with subsequent detections in the Track function (A.7.3). Detection 
is required before tracking, but once a detection is made, the detection process becomes a 
step within the Track function. 
G. TRACK (FUNCTION A.7.3) 
Once the area has been searched and an object detected, a decision is made to 
track this specific object. The Track function is depicted in Figure 10. To distinguish the 
contact from other objects detected in the mission area, a unique label is assigned to the 







Figure 10.  Track (A.7.3) 
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To track the labeled contact, subsequent detections from the sensors are fused and 
used to develop the measures of speed and course (A.7.3.2–A.7.3.4). With course, speed, 
and location determined a predicted closest point of approach (CPA) to the HVU Critical 
Zone, a predicted future contact position, and a predicted intercept point can be determined 
(A.7.3.5–A.7.3.7). Each of these characteristics are used to update the contact 
characteristics file (A.7.3.8). Based on the characteristics and known positions or zones of 
interest, the contact can be assigned another label: a Contact of Interest (COI) (A.7.3.9). A 
COI is a contact that is positioned or is moving in such a manner that it could potentially 
affect ship or HVU operations, or cause operational or defense concerns for the ship. The 
specific criteria for COI labeling would be included in the loaded Mission Data. Giving a 
contact a COI label increases the contact investigation priority over other tracked contacts. 
Tracking continues whether a contact meets COI criteria or not. This is depicted as a loop 
in Figure 10.  
When a contact is labeled as a COI, the AVACC determines where it must position 
itself to resolve the COI’s type, classification and identity (A.7.3.10) while continuing the 
track loop. This determination generates a maneuver command. The AVACC positions 
itself based on the best position determination. Maneuver in the Operational Area (A.8) is 
described as a flight control function that occurs concurrently with the entire Perform 
Mission (A.7) function as shown in Figure 3.  
H. RESOLVE CONTACTS (FUNCTION A.7.4) 
The next step in the standard F2T2EA process would be to target the tracked 
contact. However, targeting requires knowing more about a contact than its position, its 
speed and, where it is moving. Additional information is needed to describe what the 
contact is. Visual information is required to determine the contact type, its classification, 
and its identity. In manned systems, the visual sensor data interpretation is completed by a 
human operator. To fill the capability gap, the typing, classification, and identification is 
performed by the AVACC. Resolve Contacts (A.7.4), which is based on the processes a 





Figure 11.  Resolve Contacts (A.7.4)
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Contacts are further scrutinized in the Resolve Contacts process while tracking 
the contact continues. Resolving the contact primarily requires interpreting visual and/or 
infrared sensor data (A.7.4.1). Once an image of the contact is obtained it becomes part 
of the Contact Characteristics which the system uses to Identify the Contact. Identify 
Contact (A.7.4.2) is decomposed into sub functions and is shown in Figure 12.  
1. Decomposed Identify Contact (Function A.7.4.2) 
The functions that decompose Identify Contact (A.7.4.2) all include “decision 
making,” matching, and comparisons type functions and are depicted in Figure 12.  When 
performed by a human operator, the human’s perception of the data, their knowledge of 
how the data is put together and their prior experiences with similar tasks are relied on to 
reach a final result. For the AVACC, the functions must be completed by executing 
algorithms that are model representations of the human operator’s cognitive process. 
There are different ways to model a human’s cognitive process; it is possible for 
completely different algorithms to perform the same task and achieve the same result. 
Because of this, information pertaining to the algorithm process must be included with 
the algorithm results in the human-AVACC interaction. 
In the Compare Collected Data to Known Information function (A.7.4.2.1) the 
AVACC must determine what data in the Contact Characteristics is pertinent to 
ultimately identify the contact. The contact image is not used in this comparison. 
Algorithms compare collected data in the Contact Characteristics to pre-programmed 
mission briefs, intelligence reports and a pre-loaded Ship Recognition Knowledge 
Database that includes all potential vessels that may or may not be operating in the 
assigned mission area to develop a refined Possible Contact List. Once the collected data 
has been compared to known data the results of the comparison, the Possible Contact 
List, and the Contact Image are used to determine the contact type (A.7.4.2.2), 
classification (A.7.4.3), and identification (A.7.4.4). 
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Figure 12.  Identify Contact (A.7.4.2) 
Determine Contact type (A.7.4.2.2) is performed by comparing the contact’s size 
and speed to predetermined thresholds and the Possible Contact List. Based on speed and 
size, the contact type is labeled as a surface vessel, an aircraft, or potentially a subsurface 
contact’s periscope. The AVACC would need to utilize image processing algorithms that 
examine the Contact Image for this function. 
Classification of a contact (A.7.4.2.3) is resolved after the type is determined and 
is a further refinement of the contact description. Classification examples for contacts of 
the surface vessel type include warship, container ship, and fishing vessel to name a few. 
In a manned system a human operator would perform the classification by comparing the 
visual information to a known data base or experience with the imagery of different 
vessels. The AVACC would utilize image processing algorithms to execute this function. 
Identifying the contact (A.7.4.2.4) includes assigning a country of origin, hull 
number, name or other detailed descriptions that identify the contact as unique. In a 
manned system this is performed by a human who compares sensor data, primarily 
visual, to a learned or available database of different vessels. The AVACC would again 
need image processing algorithms and a database of vessel images to execute this 
function. 
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Because determining the type, classification and, identification of the contact all 
involve a human cognitive processes, each of these three functions require more than the 
algorithms’ generated results in the contact report. The algorithms need to be developed 
so that they provide results that are understood by the humans expected to use the 
information provided. Additionally, because intermediate algorithm steps cannot be 
observed without a communication link, justification for the results, explanation in how 
the results were determined, and the actual results must be included in the communication 
exchange via the Contact Report. 
2. Functions A.7.4.3–A.7.4.6 
The output from Identify Contact is a collection of information labeled Contact 
Report Data which used in the generation of the Contact Report (A.7.4.3). Once the 
Contact Report is generated, it is sent to the ship. It is important to understand that the 
Contact Report in this model is NOT the human-system interface. The Contact Report is 
a collection of information that is provided to the human-system interface.  
A communication link must be verified or established before sending the contact 
report (A.7.4.4). If the AVACC is not in communication with the ship, a Maneuver 
Command is generated (A.7.4.5) and sent to the flight computer to move the AVACC 
into communication range (A.8). When communication is established, the contact report 
is transmitted to the ship (A.7.4.6). 
The entire mission process occurs without human interaction or direct 
supervision. The Contact Report is the first, and possibly only, AVACC to human 
information exchange about the operational area beyond the ship’s sensor horizon. When 
the contact report is transmitted, the AVACC has left the mission area. The ship cannot 
gain any further information about the mission area other than what is included in the 
Contact Report. 
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I. ISR MISSION FUNCTIONS NOT MODELED 
As stated in sections C and D of this chapter, some of the higher level functions 
are not decomposed in this functional architecture. The following sections provide 
general descriptions of these functions. 
1. Kill Chain Functions (A.7.5–A.7.7) 
The Kill Chain functions after Resolve Contacts (A.7.4) do not fit into an ISR 
mission. Additionally, the restrictions stated in DOD directive 3000.09 (2012, 3) for 
“autonomous” systems prohibit targeting and engagement of contacts without human 
interaction. While the AVACC performs the first half of the modified F2T2EA Kill 
Chain (A.7.1–A.7.4), another system would be required to Target (A.7.5), Engage 
(A.7.6), and Asses (A.7.7) an identified vessel. 
2. High Level Functions A.9–A.13 
As mentioned in Section C of this chapter, the entire ISR mission process is not 
modeled; the focus is on the Perform Mission (A.7) function. With the Contact Report 
sent (A.7.4.6) to the ship, and communication reestablished, the AVACC would interact 
with the humans on the ship to complete the ISR mission by performing the remaining 
functions (A.9– A.13) which are depicted in Figure 3.  
J. SUMMARY 
The model provided in this chapter has explained the processes the AVACC must 
complete to meet the ISR mission. The model gives a small, specific example of what 
automation in a system would have to do if it replaced human sensor operator. Factors 
such as communication security, AVACC physical movement, and others are not 
modeled. The purpose for keeping the model simplified is to keep the focus on the trust 
needs related to AVACC identifying a vessel at sea. Further decomposition could change 
the focus to how an algorithm should be created to perform the actions. In many cases 
different algorithms could conceivably be written to complete the same function. 
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From the decomposed model it is clear that automation in the AVACC’s design is 
critical to closing the capability gap. The AVACC’s automation controlled processes are 
what must be trusted by the humans that assign the AVACC the ISR mission and also by 
any human that interacts with the AVACC or its Contact Report. 
In the next chapter, the decomposed functions describing the Perform Mission 
function (A.7) are analyzed for how they affect trust in the AVACC. This analysis will 
identify the trust needs that can be used to write system hardware or software 
requirements for the AVACC. The decomposed Perform Mission functions are provided 
in Table 1.   
Table 1.   Perform Mission Functions Identified from Process Model 
Number Function Name  Number Function Name 
A.7.1.1 Determine Self Position  A.7.3.2 Fuse Sensor Data/Contact 
Information 
A.7.1.2 Determine HVU Critical Zones  A.7.3.3 Determine Contact Speed 
A.7.1.3.1 Define Area of Interest  A.7.3.4 Determine Contact Course 
A.7.1.3.2 Determine Optimal Search 
Pattern 
 A.7.3.5 Determine CPA to HVU Critical 
Zone 
A.7.1.3.3 Search Area with Sensors  A.7.3.6 Predict Contact Future Position 
A.7.2.1.1 Define Detection Criteria  A.7.3.7 Predict Intercept to Contact 
A.7.2.1.2.1 Passively Detect EM Signal  A.7.3.8 Update Contact Characteristics 
A.7.2.1.2.2 Receive Radar Return  A.7.3.9 Determine if COI 
A.7.2.1.2.3 Detect a Visual Image  A.7.3.10 Determine Best Resolution Location 
A.7.2.1.2.4 Detect an IR Image  A.7.4.1 Collect Contact Image 
A.7.2.1.3 Geo-locate Detection Position  A.7.4.2.1 Compare Collected Data to Known 
Information 
A.7.2.1.4 Determine Detection Range & 
Bearing from Self 
 A.7.4.2.2 Determine Contact Type 
A.7.2.1.5 Categorize Detection by Sensor  A.7.4.2.3 Determine Contact Classification 
A.7.2.2 Assign Detection Type (Initial 
or Tracked) 
 A.7.4.2.4 Determine Contact Identification 
A.7.2.3 Mark (Fix) Location of 
Detection  
 A.7.4.3 Generate Contact Report 
A.7.2.4 Create Contact at Fix Location   A.7.4.4 Determine if Communication 
Established 
A.7.2.5 Record Initial Contact 
Information  
 A.7.4.5 Generate/Send Maneuver Request 




Transmit Contact Report 
 
A.7.3.1 Assign Unique Contact Label  
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Ultimately, the factors that affect, and can be used to calibrate, trust will be 
leveraged in the AVACC-human interaction at an interface. However, before the 
requirements for an interface can be developed, the sources of trust affecting factors must 
be identified and requirements for the AVACC must be written that ensure the factors are 
made available to the interface. 
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V. ANALYZING PERFORM MISSION FUNCTIONS FOR TRUST 
NEEDS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter III, Section D, a distinction was made between automation processes 
that are equation-based and those that are algorithmic-based. It was stated that the 
methods can affect trust differently. In the AVACC system, information is created, and 
actions are performed using both methods. However, while Chapter IV mentions using 
equations and algorithms for some of the modeled functions, the author acknowledges 
that the term “algorithm” is too broad when discussing the methods used by a computer 
to complete actions; a computer program is essentially a series of algorithms. Therefore, 
to properly address the differences between the functions, different descriptions are 
warranted.  
Some of the functions that the AVACC must perform are normally completed by 
human thinking or decision-making processes in a manned system. Instead of using 
“equation-based” and “algorithmic-based” to describe the Perform Mission functions, 
they can be categorized by whether they represent human cognitive processes or not. The 
DSB (2016) discussion about the barriers to trust in automation provides an explanation 
to why these types of functions are unique. The report states: 
For some specific algorithm choices—such as neuromorphic pattern 
recognition for image processing, optimization algorithms for decision-
making, deep neural networks for learning, and so on—the “reasoning” 
employed by the machine may take on a strikingly different path than that 
of a human decision-maker. (2016, 14) 
The Perform Mission functions are then separated into two categories described 
by functions that are not “reasoning” functions (Defense Science Board 2016, 14) and 
those that are. This chapter will analyze all of the Perform Mission functions based on the 
Chapter III discussion on trust. How each of the Reasoning and Non-Reasoning functions 
affect human knowledge, beliefs and perceptions through the AVACC purpose, 
performance and process (Madhavan and Weigmann 2007, 280) will be addressed. The 
Non-Reasoning functions will be analyzed first followed by the Reasoning functions. 
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B. NON-REASONING FUNCTIONS  
Of the 37 Perform Mission functions identified in the Chapter IV AVACC ISR 
mission model, 25 are Non-Reasoning functions. These 25 Non-Reasoning functions are 
further characterized as Database Read and Write functions, Equation functions, and 
Sensor functions. 
1. Database Read and Write Functions 
Ten of the Non-Reasoning functions are categorized as Database Read and Write 
functions. These functions either write sensor, equation, or Reasoning function data to 
computer files, or look up (read) data in the loaded Mission Data. The Database Read and 
Write functions are listed in Table 2.  The Generate Contact Report function (A.7.4.3) 
was determined to be a special case of the Non-Reasoning Database Read and Write 
function category, and is analyzed separately in the next section. 
Table 2.   Non-Reasoning Database Read and Write Functions 
Database Read and Write Functions 
Number Function Name Write or Read 
A.7.1.2 Determine HVU Critical Zones Read 
A.7.1.3.1 Define Area of Interest Read 
A.7.2.1.5 Categorize Detection by Sensor Write 
A.7.2.2 Mark (Fix)Location of Detection Write 
A.7.2.3 Create Contact at Fix Location Write 
A.7.2.4 Record Initial Contact Information Write 
A.7.2.5 Update Existing Contact Information Write 
A.7.3.1 Assign Unique Contact Label Write 
A.7.3.8 Update Contact Characteristics Write 
A.7.4.3 Generate Contact Report Read/Write 
 
The Database Read and Write functions are part of the process that the AVACC 
performs to eventually identify a vessel, which is the purpose of the system. All of these 
functions describe actions that create data that will be used in the Reasoning functions, or 
are inputs to the Contact Characteristics. Those that are inputs to Contact Characteristics 
are included in the Contact Report as shown throughout the model in Chapter IV. They 
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do not have trust needs associated with how they are written or read; they basically 
describe computer bookkeeping. But, their inclusion in the Contact Report is necessary 
for fully describing a contact. Identifying a contact but not having information that 
describes its location, speed, and direction of travel, is not very useful. 
Two functions are labeled as Read in Table 2.  These functions can affect trust in 
the AVACC processes. For example, the Search Mission Area function (A.7.1.3), 
described in Chapter IV, Section F., includes an optional resource for the Determine Area 
of Interest (A.7.1.3.1) function. The optional resource, could conflict with, or be 
significantly different than loaded Mission Data. Therefore, the source of the read data 
should be communicated in the Contact Report. Reporting the source of read data 
provides knowledge of why the AVACC performed its search in a certain location. If a 
Contact Report was received that described a contact in an area that was not described by 
the loaded Mission Data, the perception of the AVACC processes are influenced 
negatively, and the human may be inclined to stop using the AVACC. This follows 
Parasuraman and Riley’s (1997, 244–246) discussion of automation disuse. If the source 
of the read data that caused the AVACC to search in an area is included in the Contact 
Report, knowledge and perception of the AVACC’s process is influenced which supports 
trust calibration. It may be appropriate to reject some AVACC generated data because 
computers do error. So, providing data to the human that can clarify unexpected 
discontinuities can increase the likelihood that the human will understand and accept the 
results. For the Database Read and Write functions, the easiest way to facilitate this is to 
define Mission Data by a Mission Number and include the Mission Number in the 
Contact Report. This creates a trust need for the AVACC: 
 All data that is loaded into the AVACC computer systems, whether before 
launching or after, needs to be defined by the Mission Number. 
a. Special Case of the Generate Contact Report (A.7.4.3) 
The Contact Report is the sole means of communication between the AVACC and 
humans on the ship about the mission. Therefore, it must include all necessary 
information about the contact identification as well as any other information that is 
necessary to calibrate trust in the AVACC. 
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The Generate Contact Report function (A.7.4.3), as modeled, was not intended to 
be a Reasoning Function; the AVACC does not use automation to “decide” what is in, or 
how to format the Contact Report. The function is a summary output of the analysis 
performed by the AVACC. 
The data provided in the Contact Report includes the Contact Characteristics as 
well as contact type, classification, and identification. As will be seen in the rest of the 
chapter, additional information that is deemed necessary for calibrating trust in the 
AVACC generated data also must be included in the Contact Report. The additional 
information is identified by analyzing the methods by which the AVACC completes 
Perform Mission functions for trust needs. 
The Contact Report is the medium by which the AVACC and human interact; it is 
part of the interface. The contents of the Contact Report are how the AVACC’s purpose, 
process and performance can influence trust calibration through knowledge, beliefs and 
perceptions. If the Generate Contact Report function was a Reasoning function, the 
AVACC would need to provide the “reasoning” behind its “decisions” to include or 
exclude data as part of the Contact Report. The “reasoning” would have to be understood 
and trusted by the humans in the interaction. Thus, an analysis into what attributes of the 
automation (purpose, process, and performance) can influence the human’s trust (through 
knowledge, beliefs and perceptions) would be needed for this function. The Reasoning 
functions in this chapter are analyzed in this way, but Generate Contact Report is not. It is 
the author’s opinion that increasing the number of automated functions in a system 
should be performed in an iterative manner. Before the AVACC can be given the 
authority to determine what needs to be communicated in the Contact Report, the 
contents of a Contact Report that communicates enough information to calibrate trust in 
the AVACC must be determined. Therefore, Generate Contact Report is a Non-
Reasoning function. 
The next trust need for the AVACC is therefore identified: 
 The Contact Report needs to include sufficient information to calibrate 
human trust in the AVACC generated vessel identification, and the 
methods by which the identification was determined. 
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This trust need is obviously vague but can only be refined by analyzing the other 
Perform Mission functions for what “sufficient information” means. 
2. Equation Functions 
The next category, Equation Functions, includes six of the Non-Reasoning 
functions. As the name implies, these functions are completed by mathematically relating 
variables created by the sensors, time, and loaded Mission Data to each other to create 
new information about the contact. Each of the Equation function’s results are included 
as part of the Contact Characteristics, and thus the Contact Report, and are used in 
Reasoning function algorithms as shown in the model in Chapter IV. The Equation 
Functions are listed in Table 3.   
Table 3.   Non-Reasoning Equation Functions 
Equation Functions 
Number Function Name 
A.7.2.1.4 Determine Detection Range & Bearing from Self 
A.7.3.3 Determine Contact Speed 
A.7.3.4 Determine Contact Course 
A.7.3.5 Determine CPA to HVU Critical Zone 
A.7.3.6 Predict Contact Future Position 
A.7.3.7 Predict Intercept to Contact 
 
Together, sensor output and GPS data describe the position of a detection or 
contact. Similarly, GPS data provides the position of the AVACC. The HVU Critical 
Zones are defined by the Mission Data. With positions defined, and the elapsed time 
between subsequent positions recorded, all of the Equation functions can be calculated. 
Equation functions that determine range (or distance) and bearing (or course) use 
trigonometry. Positions are defined by latitude and longitude from the GPS data, and 
changes in the latitude and longitude between two location points are first determined. 
The Pythagorean Theorem is applied to the latitude and longitude differences to 
determine range (or distance) between the two points. The inverse tangent function is 
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applied to the quotient of the change in longitude (the dividend) and the change in 
latitude (the divisor) to determine angular bearing (or course) from one point to another. 
Functions that determine speed are calculated by dividing the distance between 
two subsequently recorded positions (determined by applying the Pythagorean Theorem) 
by the elapsed time between the positions. The two prediction functions determine future 
positions based on the contact current position, the calculated course, and the calculated 
speed of the entity of interest. 
None of the Equation functions include any “reasoning” action. The results they 
provide are only affected by the accuracy of the variables in their respective calculations. 
The accuracy of the variables trace to the performance of the system sensors. The 
sensors’ operational status can be provided to affect perception of the system. This was 
discussed in Chapter III, Section B. by paraphrasing the example studies from 
Parasuraman and Riley (1997, 236–237). Additionally, Lyons, summarizing Wang et al. 
(2013), agrees and states that “indicators of [sensor] reliability can be a useful piece of 
information to users as this may help the humans calibrate their trust” (Lyons 2013, 52). 
Equation function data can affect trust. Perception of the performance of the system 
sensors should be addressed to aid with calibrating trust in the AVACC. Therefore, 
another trust need is identified: 
 System sensor operational statuses need to be communicated at the 
human-machine interface to affect proper calibration of trust. The 
operational status affects the perception of the AVACC’s ability to meet 
its purpose and execute its processes. 
3. Sensor Functions 
The remaining nine Non-Reasoning functions fit into the Sensor Function 
category. The Sensor Functions are those that describe sensor actions and sensor specific 





Table 4.   Non-Reasoning Sensor Functions 
Sensor Functions 
Number Function Name Associated Sensor 
A.7.1.1 Determine Self Position GPS 
A.7.1.3.3 Search Area with Sensors Radar, ESM, Visual, IR 
A.7.2.1.1 Define Detection Criteria Radar, ESM, Visual, IR 
A.7.2.1.2.1 Passively Detect EM Signal ESM 
A.7.2.1.2.2 Receive Radar Return Radar 
A.7.2.1.3 Geo-locate Contact Position GPS, Radar, ESM, Visual, IR 
A.7.4.1 Collect Contact Image Visual, IR 




A.7.4.6 Transmit Contact Report Data Link 
(Transmitter/Receiver) 
 
The Sensor functions all involve operating one or more of the sensor subsystems 
installed on the AVACC. The purpose for each of the sensors subsystems needs to be 
addressed prior to interaction with the AVACC because they each help describe the 
capabilities and limitations of the system. Education and training are methods that can be 
used to affect knowledge and perception of the AVACC sensor’s purposes and processes. 
The AVACC high-level capability needs such as operational range, power requirements, 
and size constraints to name a few, will determine the operational sensor characteristics. 
The sensor characteristics, based on the capability needs, set sensor thresholds. This 
information should be known prior to using the AVACC for an ISR mission. A baseline 
knowledge of the sensors’ purposes and processes will affect how trust in the system is 
calibrated. 
In addition to knowledge of sensor purposes and processes, system sensor 
performance must be addressed. Educating potential users on the AVACC system only 
provides a starting point for calibrating trust. As users interact with the AVACC via the 
Contact Report, perception of the system sensors’ performance needs to be addressed. 
Perception of sensor performance is also identified as a need for the Equation functions. 
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C. REASONING FUNCTIONS 
The Reasoning functions performed by the AVACC in the ISR mission include 
sorting, matching, and “deciding” actions. These type of functions are described 
throughout this investigation as those in which automation is used to mimic human 
thinking processes, or cognitive functions. The reader may have noticed that the ISR 
mission model in Chapter IV is developed so that it could be used to describe a manned 
system or an automated system; this was done intentionally. The model is a tool that the 
author uses to communicate the process steps that an aerial vehicle system must complete 
to identify a vessel on the open ocean to the reader. Even if the reader does not have 
experience with aerial vehicles or with ISR missions, the model can be followed and the 
process can be understood. Similarly, humans that interact with the AVACC may not 
have knowledge of, or experience with, how computer programs work. Therefore, it is 
necessary to consider what information about the processes must be supplied in the 
interaction to adequately describe how the AVACC’s processes are completed. 
In their study into judgment and trust factors in automated decision aids, Seong 
and Bisantz (2002, 247) found and state that “providing cognitive feedback information” 
to users at the human-automation interface “can actually allow human operators to 
understand the inner workings” of the automated system. In other words, providing 
information that describes how Reasoning functions are performed influences perception 
of system processes. However, care should be taken in how the cognitive feedback 
information (Seong and Bisantz 2002, 247), or in the author’s terms, process explanation 
information, is provided. Lyons notes that “too much information, or non-intuitive 
displays may confuse and frustrate users” (2013, 52). If the AVACC’s automation 
process explanation information is provided in the Contact Report but is perceived as 
confusing, trust will not be calibrated for appropriate reliance. Therefore, the correct 
information explaining the Reasoning function processes needs to be provided so that it 
can be used appropriately in the AVACC-human interaction. 
Twelve of the Perform Mission functions are Reasoning functions, and they were 
further categorized by describing them, in general terms, by the assumed methods that the 
AVACC’s computers would use to complete actions and produce information. These 
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categories are Optimization functions, Image Recognition and Image Matching functions, 
and Comparison functions. Each are described in more detail in the following sections. 
1. Optimization Reasoning Functions 
There are three Reasoning functions in the AVACC ISR mission model that are 
characterized as Optimization functions. They are listed in Table 5.   
Table 5.   Optimization Reasoning Functions 
Optimization Functions 
Number Function Name 
A.7.1.3.2 Determine Optimal Search Pattern 
A.7.3.10 Determine Best Resolution Location 
A.7.4.5 Generate Maneuver Request 
 
Each of the Optimization functions is performed by an algorithm, or series of 
algorithms written into the AVACC’s computer systems. The purpose of each of the 
Optimization functions is to find a minimum, maximum, or pre-defined “best” solution to 
a question. For the identified functions, the questions are: 
 For Determine Optimal Search Pattern, what is the “best” way to search a 
defined area given the limitations of the sensors installed on the AVACC, 
the AVACC location, the Mission Data limits (with included Intelligence 
Report), and the remaining mission time? 
 For Determine Best Resolution Location, where is the best location, given 
the AVACC operational limits, sensor limits, Mission Data limits, and 
mission time to resolve a tracked contact? 
 For Generate Maneuver Request, where should the AVACC position itself 
to reestablish communication with the ship based on current AVACC 
position, AVACC operating limitations, Mission Data, and last known 
position of the ship? 
Arguably, the “best” solution for the three Optimizing functions could include 
minimizing time, maximizing search area coverage, maximizing sensor capabilities, and 
maximizing safe standoff distance from vessels, to name a few examples. The variables 
that are considered in the algorithms to reach any of these goals could each carry 
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different weighting factors depending on how the designer, or user, describes the “best” 
solution. If the designer’s view of “best” does not match the user’s view of “best,” or if 
the designer’s “best” is not clearly communicated to the user, trust calibration will be 
negatively affected. Users would be required to blindly accept (over trust) the AVACC’s 
methods, or they could potentially reject (under trust) the AVACC’s methods. Neither of 
these outcomes are desirable. In a trust calibrated interaction, the desire is to match the 
human’s reliance on the system with the capabilities of the system. 
Prior knowledge of how the AVACC performs Optimization functions is 
necessary for trust calibration to achieve proper reliance on the system. However, 
because of the weighted nature of optimization processes, prior knowledge may not be 
enough to properly calibrate trust. Therefore, the Contact Report, which is the only 
method of communication in the modeled process, needs to include information that 
explains how optimization functions influence the identification of a vessel. The data 
from functions Determine Optimal Search Pattern (A.7.1.3.2) and Determine Best 
Resolution Location (A.7.3.10) would influence how contact identification is achieved. 
The AVACC Contact Report must include the required information for the process 
explanation to affect perception of AVACC process and also AVACC performance. The 
examples that the author listed for determining the “best” solution for the Optimization 
functions in general could all be factors that determine a search pattern. However, the 
elapsed mission time or other factors could potentially change what the “best” search 
pattern is at any given time. Why a search pattern was determined needs to be 
communicated, resulting in the following trust need: 
 The Contact Report needs to include the search pattern that was 
determined by the AVACC and the determining factors for why it was 
used. 
For similar reasons as those given for communicating search pattern determining 
factors, the resolution positon and factors that determined why the position was used need 
to be communicated. Therefore, another trust need is proposed: 
 The AVACC generated Contact Report needs to include the Resolution 
Location, described by AVACC range and bearing from the contact and 
the determining factors that “decided” the Resolution Location.  
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2. Image Recognition and Matching Reasoning Functions 
Five of the twelve Reasoning functions identified in the AVACC ISR mission 
model are characterized as Image Recognition and Image Matching functions. These are 
listed in Table 6.   
Table 6.   Image Recognition and Image Matching Reasoning Functions 
Image Recognition and Matching Functions 
Number Function Name 
A.7.2.1.2.3 Detect a Visual Image 
A.7.2.1.2.4 Detect an IR Image 
A.7.4.2.2 Determine Contact Type 
A.7.4.2.3 Determine Contact Classification 
A.7.4.2.4 Determine Contact Identification 
 
Imagery is the key component to all of the Image Recognition and Image 
Matching functions. For the AVACC (or a human) to identify a vessel at sea, it must be 
“seen.” In Chapter IV, Section I, Google™’s image recognition software was mentioned 
as an example for how automation can be used to interpret visual information. However, 
the ability to interpret visual information is not sufficient unless how the interpretation 
was performed is understood and appropriately trusted. 
For a human operator, the eye collects light waves, and the brain determines what 
the light waves mean. Similarly, the optics in visual sensors, and a combination of optics 
and a thermal sensor for IR sensors, collect EM energy. The sensor’s processors together 
with the automation, determine what the collected EM energy means. The components 
are comparable in purpose, but not in process or performance. 
Image recognition requires experience, knowledge, and perception. How humans 
put these together to decide (consciously or subconsciously) what is seen can functionally 
be described through models. Parasuraman et al. provide a simplified four stage model 
for how human information processing occurs. Decision Making is the third stage. They 
describe the first and second stages as the transition from sensory input and sensory 
processing through full “conscious perception and manipulation of processed and 
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retrieved information in working memory” (2000, 287) as prerequisites to decision 
making. A completely decomposed version of this model could be used as the foundation 
for writing algorithms to mimic the human process. However, the human decision-
making model used has to be known and understood prior to, and during, the human-
AVACC interaction. 
Two notable, completely different methods are widely cited as models for how 
human decision making occurs, or should occur. The first method, referenced extensively 
by Danial Kahneman (2011) in his book “Thinking, Fast and Slow,” was focused on the 
use of rigid algorithmic steps to reach conclusions. The argument for this method is that 
biases and heuristics can prevent humans from reaching the “best,” or correct outcome 
for a given decision. Therefore, following defined procedural steps will yield the “best,” 
or correct result. 
However, depending on the variables used in the algorithmic steps, and how they 
are weighted, unexpected or irrational conclusions can occur. This is one reason why 
defenders of the second method for modeling, Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM), 
reject a strict algorithmic method (Kahneman 2011, 234) to describe human decision-
making processes. Instead, NDM includes heuristics and biases in its methods. One NDM 
model, that could be used as a foundation for the AVACC Image Recognition and 
Matching functions is Klein’s (1997, 285–292) Recognition Primed Decision Making 
(RPD) model, specifically the iteration of the model for expert decision making. 
For automation to replace human decision making, it may make sense to model 
the automation processes after accepted models that describe an expert’s method for 
decision-making. Dorman et al. (2016) provide an initial proof of concept for how RPD 
can be used as a foundation supervisory control of automation. One problem that arises in 
using RPD or other NDM methods for the AVACC is that a communication link is not 
continuous. The expert-based biases or heuristics would have to be programmed into the 
automation’s algorithms and operate without supervision. This could lead to very 
complex algorithms that would be difficult to explain to a user; especially in the 
AVACC-human interaction. Further, using an expert’s decision-making model as the 
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foundation requires programming expert-based “experience” into the AVACC and 
explaining to the humans how the “experience” affects the outcome. 
Due to complexity issues, it seems that the strict algorithmic method must be 
followed for automation to complete the Image Recognition and Image Matching 
functions. However, the possibility of absurd or irrational results persists. Knowledge of 
the possibility that computer algorithms can error in this way is not enough to calibrate 
trust. Neither is knowledge of the method used in the automation’s “decision making.” 
Reasoning function results, specifically Image Recognition and Image Matching function 
results, must be explained during operational interactions to affect trust calibration in the 
AVACC, especially since methods cannot be observed without a constant communication 
link. 
The algorithms used for the Image Recognition and Matching functions would 
interpret imagery and match elements in the image to known Mission Data elements that 
describe different vessel characteristics. The image elements that are used, and matched 
to the known elements, need to be communicated in the Contact Report.  
 The AVACC Contact Report needs to include the image used to type, 
classify, and identify the vessel. 
 The AVACC Contact Report needs to provide, and label the specific 
image characteristics used to determine the vessel type, classification, and 
identification. 
 The AVACC Contact Report needs to include Mission Data elements that 
match contact image elements and are used for vessel type, classification, 
and identification. 
3. Comparison Reasoning Functions 
The remaining four Reasoning functions identified in the AVACC ISR mission 
model are characterized as Comparison functions. The Comparison functions are listed in 
Table 7.   
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Table 7.   Comparison Reasoning Functions 
Comparison Functions 
Number Function Name 
A.7.2.2 Assign Detection Type (Initial or Tracked) 
A.7.3.2 Fuse Sensor Data/Contact Information 
A.7.3.9 Determine if COI 
A.7.4.2.1 Compare Collected Data to Known Information 
 
Much like the Image Recognition and Matching functions, the Comparison 
functions relate collected sensor data to known information from the Mission Data loaded 
into the AVACC’s computers prior to launch. The comparisons are completed by 
applying statistical methods in algorithms that again could follow different human 
decision-making models.  
Assign Detection Type (A.7.2.2) determines if a sensor detection is an initial 
detection, which would result in developing a fix, or if a detection is associated with a 
tracked contact in the case where Detect (A.7.2) is a sub function of Track (A.7.3). The 
algorithms written for assigning the detection type would use probability-based methods 
to “decide” if the sensor data describes a new contact or not. Knowledge of the 
“decision” criteria used in the algorithm, an automation process, can affect the base line 
trust attitude toward the system but reporting the “decision” for all detections in the 
Contact Report is unnecessary and could confuse the user. This Reasoning function does 
not have a design specific trust need. 
Fuse Sensor Data/Contact Information compares the data between different 
sensors. The algorithms written for this function could also use probability-based 
methods to determine if the data from the different sensors describe the same contact. If 
so, the data from each sensor is used to further refine Contact Characteristics such as 
location, course, and speed to name few. The Contact Characteristics are part of the 
Contact Report and knowing which sensor(s) were involved in developing characteristic 
data points can influence trust in the Contact Report information. Each of the sensors will 
have their own accuracy and precision, both of which can influence how well sensed data 
describes the same contact. Sensor accuracy and precision can influence the “decision” 
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process for or against combining two or more detections from different sensors together 
to describe a single entity. Knowing which data is Fused data, and why it is Fused, affects 
trust in the AVACC through perception of process, resulting in the following trust need: 
 Contact Characteristics included in the Contact Report need to 
communicate the source of the characteristic data by the sensor(s) that 
created the data. 
 Contact Characteristics that result from combining separate sensor data 
need to be identified in the Contact Report as Fused Data. The “reasoning” 
behind fusing the data needs to be communicated. 
Determining if a contact is a COI requires comparing Contact Characteristics to 
predetermined COI trigger characteristics included in the Mission Data. Some example 
COI triggers could be contact distance from HVU Critical Zones, contact speed, contact 
course, or combinations of these individual characteristics to name a few. Much like the 
discussion for other functions, different variables that trigger a COI label could be 
weighted differently depending on how the algorithms or Mission Data are written. Why 
the AVACC “decided” to label a contact as a COI is important to the human’s perception 
of the AVACC’s process and how well it meets the purpose. This is captured in the 
following trust need. 
 The Contact Characteristics that trigger labeling a contact as a COI needs 
to be included in the AVACC Contact Report. 
The last of the Compare Functions, Compare Collected Data to Known 
Information, is procedurally right before Determine Contact Type in the ISR Process. All 
AVACC developed Contact Characteristics, with the exception of imagery, are compared 
to known Mission Data information to provide the Possible Contact List. The Possible 
Contact List directly influences and is refined by the type, classification, and 
identification determinations. Providing the entire Possible Contact List in the Contact 
Report could cause confusion; the list could be very large depending on the number of 
matches that exist between the Contact Characteristics and Mission Data. The entire list 
should not be provided in the Contact Report. 
However, the Possible Contact list could unintentionally influence a contact 
identification. The Mission Data includes a loaded intelligence brief (or more accurately 
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intelligence based data points) and Ship Recognition Knowledge Database that may not 
include or adequately match what the AVACC “sees” in the image. In such cases the 
AVACC still needs to provide information about what has been found in the Contact 
Report. Therefore, if the AVACC cannot determine a vessel identification from the 
sensed and load data it has, the closest possible matches should be included in the 
Contact Report. Why any of the vessels on the Possible Contact List are “close” matches 
should also be communicated. 
It is not the author’s intent to state how many, or what Contact Characteristics or 
imagery elements, which could collectively be called Identification Factors, are needed to 
for the AVACC to complete a vessel identification. That determination would be made 
by the designers of the AVACC based on an analysis of the number of characteristics a 
human (possibly an expert) uses to complete a vessel identification. Instead, the intent is 
to ascertain what in the identification process needs to be communicated for a human to 
appropriately trust the automation generated solution. Prior to interacting with the 
AVACC, the human must know how many, and what types of Identification Factors are 
needed to make an identification. This establishes a baseline knowledge and perception 
of the AVACC’s processes. In the interaction, the human perception of process and 
performance can be influenced to appropriately calibrate trust by communicating the 
number of and type of Identification Factors that are used in the identification or “close 
match” given in the Contact Report. This is captured in the following trust need: 
 The Contact Report needs to list Identification Factors used in the 
identification “decision,” and provide a total count for these factors. 
D. REQUIREMENTS FROM TRUST NEEDS 
Analyzing the Perform Mission functions of the AVACC ISR mission shows that 
trust needs do trace to the system; the needs do not only apply at the interface. This is an 
important point to consider in system design especially for systems that cannot be 
monitored during mission execution. The identified trust needs from this analysis can be 
used to develop AVACC software functional requirements. The trust needs and examples 
of requirements are provided in Table 8.   
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Table 8.   AVACC Trust Needs and Example Requirements 
AVACC Trust Needs 
 
Associated Software Functional 
Requirements 
All data that is loaded into the AVACC 
computer systems, whether before 
launching or after, needs to be defined by 
Mission Number. 
 
 All data loaded into the AVACC 
computer systems shall include a 
Mission Number. 
System sensor operational statuses need to 
be communicated at the human-machine 
interface to affect proper calibration of trust. 
The operational status affects the perception 
of the AVACC’s ability to meet its purpose 
and execute its processes. 
 
 The Contact Report shall include 
system statuses of all onboard 
subsystems. 
The Contact Report needs to include the 
search pattern that was determined by the 
AVACC and the determining factors for 
why it was used. 
 
 The AVACC search pattern route shall 
be included in the Contact Report. 
 
 The factor(s) that the AVACC search 
pattern optimizes shall be included in 
the Contact Report. 
 
The AVACC generated Contact Report 
needs to include the Resolution Location, 
described by AVACC range and bearing 
from the contact and the determining factors 
that “decided” the Resolution Location. 
 
 The Resolution Location will be 
defined by bearing and range from the 
AVACC and shall be included in the 
Contact Report. 
 
 The factor(s) that the Resolution 
Location optimizes shall be included in 
the Contact Report. 
The AVACC Contact Report needs to 
include the image used to type, classify, and 
identify the vessel. 
 
 The Contact Image used for 
determining contact type, 
classification, and identification shall 
be included in the Contact Report. 
The AVACC Contact Report needs to 
provide, and label the specific image 
characteristics used to determine the vessel 
type, classification, and identification. 
 Image characteristics used to 
determine contact type, classification, 
and identification shall be listed in the 
Contact Report. 
The AVACC Contact Report needs to 
include Mission Data elements that match 
contact image elements and are used for 
vessel type, classification, and 
identification. 
 
 Mission data matching image 
characteristics used to determine 
contact type, classification, and 
identification shall be listed in the 
Contact Report. 
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AVACC Trust Needs 
 
Associated Software Functional 
Requirements 
Contact Characteristics included in the 
Contact Report need to communicate the 
source of the characteristic data by the 
sensor(s) that created the data. 
 
 All Contact Characteristics included in 
the Contact Report shall include the 
source(s) of the data as part of the 
characteristic data point. 
Contact Characteristics that result from 
combining separate sensor data need to be 
identified in the Contact Report as Fused 
Data. The “reasoning” behind fusing the 
data needs to be communicated. 
 
 Fused data included in the Contact 
Report shall include a “fused data” 
label as part of the characteristic data 
point. 
 
 The rationale (trigger) that the 
AVACC’s computers use to equate 
two or more different sensor’s outputs 
as describing the same entity shall be 
listed with the respective fused data 
point. 
The Contact Characteristics that trigger 
labeling a contact as a COI needs to be 
included in the AVACC Contact Report. 
 
 The Contact Characteristic(s) that 
drive categorizing a contact as a COI 
shall be labeled as a COI Characteristic 
in the Contact report. 
The Contact Report needs to list 
Identification Factors used in the 
identification “decision,” and provide a total 
count for these factors. 
 
 The Contact Report shall include the 
number, and nomenclature of positive 




VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The objective of this research was to develop trust need statements and system 
trust requirements that are traceable to functions in a process performed by a human-
automation system. This objective was met by using established theory and empirical 
findings from multiple studies on trust and automation in the functional analysis of the 
AVACC on an ISR mission.  
The functional analysis provided does not cover all process functions from 
AVACC launch to landing. Instead, the analysis focuses on the high-level Perform 
Mission function. For the AVACC to conduct an ISR without a communication link, the 
Perform Mission function must be completely allocated to the AVACC. Therefore, this 
function provides a good starting point for analyzing an “autonomous” system’s 
functional architecture for trust needs. 
A. DISCUSSION 
The rationale for using a functional analysis as a method for identifying trust 
needs in a system is based on when the functional analysis occurs in the Systems 
Engineering (SE) process. Functional analysis occurs early in the SE process after the 
problem definition and high-level capability needs have been determined (Blanchard and 
Fabrycky 2011, 33–35). First, an operational scenario is developed to describe what 
actions must be completed to meet the capability needs and provide a solution to the 
problem. The actions, or functions, described in the scenario are then used to create the 
system’s functional architecture; typically, the architecture is modeled-based. 
Architecture modeling methods such as FFBDs use a top down approach decomposing 
high-level functions into sub-functions to describe the sequential relationship of the 
functions. For the purposes of this research, the functional decomposition stops when a 
logical hierarchy of steps has been developed and the lowest level functions can be 
allocated to humans, hardware, or software components. At this point in the SE process, 
functions are analyzed and requirements are written for the system even though a specific 
design has not yet been determined. The trust needs analysis, and the development of 
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requirements based on those needs should occur at the same time. The requirements are 
the core of the system. System designers and testers ensure that the correct system is built 
to meet the defined needs by designing and testing to the written requirements. 
For this research, an existing capability was chosen: the ability to perform an ISR 
mission without constant communication with a controlling station. The capability is 
currently met with a manned aerial system. However, recent developments in automation 
technology indicate that an advanced unmanned system, or combination of advanced 
systems, could feasibly be used instead of the manned system to meet the same 
capability. 
If an advanced unmanned system, described in this research as the AVACC, were 
to replace a manned system for the ISR mission, the actions needed for mission 
accomplishment do not change very much. However, the functional allocation is 
completely different. Functions that were allocated to a human operator must now be 
assigned to software in the AVACC. In addition to function allocation, human-system 
interaction changes. With humans removed from the vehicle, the primary operational 
human-system interaction occurs when the AVACC provides a Contact Report to the 
humans on the ship. For the Contact Report to be properly accepted and used in any 
further ship mission decisions, the human must have calibrated trust in the AVACC and 
its ability meet the ISR capability. Thus, an investigation into trust in automation is 
needed to ensure the correct system is designed to meet capability needs. 
The literature on trust and automation shows that human trust is calibrated 
through their knowledge, beliefs and perceptions of the automation’s purpose, process, 
and performance (Lee and See, 2004; Madhavan and Weigmann, 2007; Ajzen, 2007). 
The functional analysis, specifically the development of the functional architecture, is the 
first place in the SE process that systems engineers can begin to analyze “autonomous 
systems” for trust needs. Performing trust analysis in conjunction with the functional 
analysis allows the systems engineer to develop trust requirements whose associated 
needs trace to the system’s operational functions and factors that affect human trust. 
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The SE process is iterative. The analysis performed in this research is only one 
step towards realizing a total system architecture and set of requirements for designing an 
“autonomous” aerial system for ISR. This first step has provided an example for how to 
ensure human trust needs are addressed and designed into the next generation of 
automated systems. The foundation of a system is laid in the beginning of the SE process 
with the generation of requirements. If the foundation is weak, or if it is missing an 
important element, the entire system is doomed to fail. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE WORK 
Expanding the trust analysis to a complete functional architecture would be the 
next step for continuing this research. Then, with trust needs identified and initial trust 
requirements written, measures of effectiveness and measures of performance used for 
testing the system for calibrated trust would be developed. 
Unfortunately, clear measures of effectiveness and measures of performance for 
trust calibration cannot be adequately developed until an initial interface design is 
considered. The trust analysis performed in this work identifies what information must be 
provided by the AVACCC in the Contact Report based on human knowledge, beliefs and 
perception of the AVACC purpose, process and performance. It does not address how the 
information in the Contact Report will be put together at the human-AVACC interface. 
From the trust analysis on the Perform Mission function, it is clear that the image 
of a vessel is critical to the identification process. The analysis also shows that providing 
the image at the interface can significantly aid in trust calibration. Therefore, it is the 
author’s recommendation that the first iteration of the human-AVACC interface be a 
visual display that incorporates the vessel image with the other Contact Report 
information that can aid in trust calibration. The display arrangement, size, use of colors 
and shapes, as well other attributes will need to be determined by performing a human 
factors analysis on display design. 
With an initial interface design in place, developmental testing for calibrated trust 
can begin. However, trust is not defined on an ordinal scale, nor is it directly 
measureable. As defined by the author in Chapter III of this research: 
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Trust is the attitude of a human, developed from beliefs, perceptions and 
knowledge of a system’s functional capabilities, towards the behavior of 
reliance in the system’s actions to achieve the human defined goals in 
situations characterized by uncertainty and vulnerability. 
The methods used in the majority of the empirical studies on trust and reliance in 
automation that are referenced in this research use reliance on automation as an 
indication of trust calibration. Desired trust calibration would be indicated by correct 
reliance on the AVACC generated, and interface displayed Contact Report information in 
multiple different situations with varying amounts of uncertainty and vulnerability. Once 
the initial developmental testing has occurred, the testing results would drive the next 
iteration of trust analysis and generation or refinement of trust requirements. 
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